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ABSTRACT 
This research is a study ofthe promotion to partner process in large law firms in 
the United Kingdom (UK). It is concerned with the application oftournament 
theory to such firms . In particular it is an examination ofthe ability of associate 
lawyers to monitor the implied promise that, in prescribed circumstances, they 
will have the opportunity of becoming a partner at their fIrms . 
In order to identify whether or not the rules of tournament theory on promotion 
to partnership hold true when set against the experiences oflawyers in large law 
fIrms operating in the UK, I established a theoretical framework based on a 
review ofthe relevant literature. I then tested that theoretical framework with 
data from two sources: case study interviews with partners at a large UK law 
fIrm; and a questionnaire distributed to a wider sample group of partners across a 
number of large UK law firms. 
The research found strong evidence to support the application of the core 
elements oftournament theory to large law firms in the UK. The research also 
found, however, that the implied promise envisaged by tournament theory was 
not the promise monitored by the individuals who took part in the research 
project. 
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Promotion to Partner in Large Law Firms operating in the United Kingdom: 
Tournament Theory and the Monitoring of the Implied Promise 
David H Shujjlebotham 
Victoria University Wellington 
[MJost of a lawyer's working life is filled with the mundane. It is 
unlikely that one of your clients will drop a smoking gun on your desk 
or ask you to have wild, passionate sex (or even unwild unpassionate 
sex). These things happen to lawyers only in John Grisham novels. 
Your life as a lawyer will be filled with the kind of things that drove 
John Grisham to write novels. 
Patrick J Schiltz (1999)' 
Part I 
Introduction 
This thesis is all about "the kind of things that drove John Grisham to write novels". 
In considering these mundane but weighty matters my aim is to build a greater 
understanding of how and why progression to partnership within large law firms 
occurs the way it does. In my experience2 much of the disquiet, lack of enjoyment 
and, at times, downright misery of lawyers working in large law firms stems from 
their lack of a basic understanding of the human dynamics of large scale legal 
practice. Plenty has been written and, more latterly, understood about the economics 
of a successful law firm but little study and explanation of the human dynamics of a 
law firm has been undertaken. This is especially the case in the United Kingdom 
(UK). A lack of knowledge of one's own situation can make people, especially 
lawyers, feel helpless and out of control of their lives at both professional and 
personal levels. My hope is that this thesis will : add to the general level of 
understanding of this area oflegal practice; help lawyers to a greater appreciation of 
the positions in which they fmd themselves ; and ultimately, a llow them to feel more 
at ease with and in command of the choices they face in their professional and 
personal lives. 
1 Patrick J Schiltz, 'Symposium : Attorn ey We ll Be ing in Larger Firms: Choices Facing Young 
Law yers' (1 999) 52 Vanderb ill Law Rev. 87 I . 
2 As a prac ti s ing lawyer, law school tutor and as HR Director of a large City of London law timl . 
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The subject matter of this thesis is the economic theory of "the Tournament" and its 
application to career progression within large law firms operating in the UK. 3 The 
tournament model is widely accepted as "the dominant academic model for 
analyzing the institutional structure oflarge law firms". 4 
The Research Question and Thesis Structure 
A key element of tournament theory, as applied to large law firms, is its explanation 
of the way in which lawyers "make partner" . Its major claim is that the implied 
promise made to associates that they have a chance of making partner at their firm 
supplies the motivational force that allows law firms to function in the way they do. 
If this theory is correct, it inextricably links the organisational structure of the firm 
with the dynamic of the promotion to partner process. 
This thesis seeks to identifY whether or not the rules of tournament theory on 
promotion to partnership hold true when set against the experiences of lawyers in 
large law firms operating in the UK. Specifically, the question I seek to answer is, 
whether or not such lawyers have the means by which they can monitor their firm's 
implied promise that a fixed percentage of them5 will be made up to partner in due 
course?6 
3 To borrow from Dav id B Wilkins and G Mitu Gulati, ' Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: 
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal La bour Markets of Elite Law Firms' 
( 1998 ) 84 Virg inia Law Rev. 158 1, throughout this thesis I use the phrases " large law firm", "elite 
law firm", "firm" and " law firm" in terchangeably. In the context of ana lys ing ex isting research, these 
terms are used to denote the sa me types of firm s considered by Marc Galanter and Thomas Pa lay, 
Tournament a/Lawyers, The Transformation a/the Big Law Firm, (199 1) and, in the context of the 
fi eld research itself, they refer to frrms likel y to be ranked in the top 50 firms, ranked by turnover, in 
The Lawyer top 100 rankings. These are the firm s which I believe to be the UK equiva lent of those 
studied by Galanter and Palay and, subsequently, by Wilkins and Gulati . 
4 Wilkins and Gu lati , op. c it ., n. 3, p. 158 1. For recent works where Tournament theory has been 
applied to the study of law finn s and the ir workings see William D Henderson, 'An Empirical Study 
of S ingle-Tier Versus Two Tier Partnerships in the AM Law 200 ' (2006) 84 North Caro lina Law 
Rev. 169 1; Bruce M Price, ' How Green Was My Va lley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a 
Governance Mechani sm in S ilicon VaHey Law Firms' (2003) 37 Law and Society Re v. 73 1; and 
Stephen M Bainbridge, ' The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Lega l Ethics' (2003) 
University o/St Thomas Law Joumal. See also Timothy Morris and Ashly Pinnington, ' Promotion to 
Par tner in Profess ional Service Firms' ( 1998) Human Relations 51,3 . 
5 Ga lanter and Pa lay, op . c it. , n. 3 , p. 100 . That is, a fi xed percentage of each "entering class" of 
lawyers. 
6 Ga lanter and Pa lay, id ., pp . 101 -102 . Also see W ilkins and Gulati op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1625 for 
consideration of assoc iates' abilities to moni tor the implied promise. 
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This thesis comprises six parts: 
Part I 
Part II 
Part III 
Part IV 
Part V 
Part VI 
Introduction - including statement of the Research Question 
Review of Literature Relevant to this Research 
Research Methodology 
Summary of Research Findings 
Part IVA - Case Study 
Part IVB - Questionnaire 
Conclusions Based on Research Findings 
Some Suggested Areas for Future Study 
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Ignorance is the curse of God; knowledge is the wing wherewith we fly to 
heaven. 
Lord Say7 
Part II 
Review of Literature Relevant to this Research 
This literature review has three main components. Firstly, it provides a retrospective 
of how tournament theory came to be used to analyse the institutional structures of 
large law fIrms . Secondly, it looks at the various critiques of the tournament model 
as applied to large law fIrms and how these critiques may have modifIed our 
understanding of tournament theory in that context. Thirdly, it draws together those 
elements of tournament theory of direct relevance to the Research Question. 
The Tournament Model 
At the start of the 1980s Lazear and Rosen, from the background oflabour 
economics, developed the general economic model of tournament theory.8 ln 
seeking to explain how wage structures of top executives work in circumstances 
where standard wage theorl does not apply, Lazear and Rosen established that 
competitive rank order tournaments can distribute resources as effIciently as 
distribution on a marginal product basis. 10 They give as an example the 
CEOlPresident of a company who on promotion to that role may triple his salar~ but 
where it " is diffIcult to argue that his skills have tripled in that one day period". 1 
7 William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, Act IV , Scene 7. 
8 Edward P Lazear and Shirwen Rosen, ' Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum Labour Contracts' 
( 198 1) 89 Journal of Po litical Economy 84 1. Subsequentl y deve loped through the works of others 
such as James M Malcomson, 'Work Ince nti ves, Hierarchy, and Lnterna l Labour Markets', ( 1984) 92 
Journal o/Political Economy 486 and Jerry R Green and N ancy L Stokey, 'A Compariso n of 
Tournaments and Contrac ts' (1983) 9 1 Journal o/Political Economy 349. See also Kevin A Kordana, 
'Law F irms and Associate Careers, Tourn ament Theo ry Versus the "Production Imperative" Mode l ' 
( 1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1907. 
9 That is, a mode l where workers are pa id on the basis of th eir productiv it y. 
10 Lazear and Rosen, op. cit. , n. 8, p. 846. 
II id , p. 847. 
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In Lazear and Rosen's view, the winner of the tournament will receive a prize equal 
to their marginal product plus the difference between the marginal product and 
wages of all competitors. 12 
They also suggest that the high wages ofCEOs of large corporations do not depend 
on their productivity as CEOs. Rather, this type of pay structure makes them (and all 
other competitors) more productive over their entire working lives. So, one of the 
key benefits of structuring rewards and career progression along tournament lines is 
the motivational impact this has on an entire workforce. Lazear and Rosen also posit 
a key proposition, as far as analysis of law firms is concerned, that tournaments will 
tend to exist where individual workers' outputs are not easily observed. 13 
Portfolio Theory and Agency Costs Analysis 
In analysing the application of the tournament model to the workings ofa large law 
firm it is important to understand the other economic forces with which the 
tournament model interacts in that context. The work of Gilson and Mnookin on 
how Portfolio Theory and Agency Costs Analysis apply to law firms is of particular 
relevance. 14 
In their analysis of Portfolio Theory, Gilson and Mnookin describe how and why 
lawyers will benefit from working together in diversified firms through the sharing 
of risks that apply to their own human capital investments. In their view, lawyers 
benefit from joining others in a diversi fied practice when it is uncertain which area 
of work (and therefore which lawyer) will prosper over a given period. The risk to a 
lawyer 's investment in learning to practise in a certain area is mitigated if that 
lawyer agrees to share returns on lawyer capital with another lawyer who has 
invested in practising in an area which should do well when the first lawyer 's 
practice is doing badly. 
In circumstances where it pays for lawyers to work together as partners, they will 
usually enter into an agreement under which they agree how they will share the 
fruits of their respective labours. Gilson and Mnookin refer to this as the "sharing 
bargain" and characterise it as "agreement to allocate firm income on a basis other 
than their respective marginal products, entered into at a time before these marginal 
products are known." 15 
Agency Costs Analysis examines the difficulties of capturing the benefits of 
portfolio diversification. Agency Costs are those costs inherently associated with the 
12 id. , p. 846. 
13 id. , p. 848 
" Ronald J G ilson and Robert H Mnookin, 'Sharing Among The Human Capitalists, An Economic 
Inquiry Into The Corporate Law Firm And How Partners Split Profits ' ( 1985) 37 Stanford Law Rev. 
313, and their detailed cons ideration of "up or out" career structures in law firms , 'Coming of Age in 
a Corporate Law Fiml , The Economics Of Associate Career Patterns ' (1989) 41 Stanford Law Rev. 
567. 
15 G ilson and Mnookin ( 1985), op. cit., n. 14 , p. 338 . 
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sharing bargain or, perhaps more accurately, the costs that arise when parties to the 
sharing bargain renege on it , commonly referred to as "cheating". 
Gilson and Mnookin name these inherent agency costs as: 
• Shirking - a partner's failure to do their "fair share" of the work; 
• Grabbing - a partner's extraction of a larger than previously agreed share of flrm 
proflts; 16 and 
• Leaving - a partner's departure from the flrm with clients and business in tow. 17 
The parties are most likely to grab and/or leave once their individual marginal 
products are known while shirking would occur during the currency of the sharing 
bargain. 
Given that sharing bargains are not legally enforceable, 18 Gilson and Mnookin seek 
to understand how the structure of an organisation can function to restrain cheating 
and hold agents to the terms of their sharing bargain. 19 In this respect, they consider 
"Firm Speciflc Capital" to be the key structural restraint that holds individual 
lawyers together in partnership by decreasing the chances of post-bargain cheating. 
They defme Firm Speciflc Capital as "the difference between a flrm ' s earnings as an 
ongoing institution and the combined value of the human capital of its individual 
partners." 20 Only partners remaining with the flrm will derive the beneflts of Firm 
Speciflc Capital. For example, if a partner cannot take a client with them when 
leaving a flrm, that client is Firm Specific Capital but, if a partner can take a client 
with them when leaving, then the client is part of that partner's individual capital. 
The more Firm Specific Capital a flrm has the less prone it will be to grabbing and 
leaving. 21 
Gilson and Mnookin also consider the strategies that might mitigate shirking. 22 They 
suggest that observing actual working hours, readily achievable as most flrms insist 
16 Usually attained by threatening to leave the firm , Gilson and Mnookin, id ., p. 321 . 
17 id ., p. 321. 
18 id. , p. 338. 
19 id ., p. 333 citing Jensen, 'Organjsation Theory and Methodology' ( 1983) 58 A CCT Rev. 31 9 and 
Jensen and Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behaviour, Agenc y Costs and Ownership 
Structure' (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 . 
20 Gilson and Mnookin ( 1985), op . cit. , n. 14, p. 354. 
21 id ., pp . 37 1 - 377 . One interesting point, though beyond th e scope o f this thesis, is that in their view 
Firm Specific Capital is more likely to accrue within firms that adopt a se niority (or lockstep) 
approach to profit div ision th an in a firm that uses a marg ina l product based approach. This is 
because of the inability of marginal product fIrms " to des ign a productivity fo rmul a that does not 
induce individual lawyers to pursue the ir own, as opposed to the fi rm 's, best interests." Margina l 
Product based firms should, therefo re, be more prone to "grabbing" and " leav ing" behaviours than 
their lockstep co unterparts. At th e same time, a Marg ina l Product fi rm should be better able to cope 
w ith shirking as they: "can better to lerate variations in perfo rmance because its method of a lloca ting 
income can take these var iations into acco unt." 
22 For th e reasons stated above G ilson and M nookin believe th at "shirking" will be more of an issue 
fo r Lockstep fi rms than Marginal Prod uct based firm s. 
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their lawyers record their time assiduously, will prevent shirking in terms of the time 
input of individuallawyers. 23 However, they are less certain of how to prevent 
shirking by lawyers as to the quality of their outputs. They suggest that "some 
combination of selection and socialization .. . create a powerful internalized work 
ethic." 24 Firm Specific Capital is important within the context of this thesis as, under 
the "rules" of tournament theory its accumulation by law firm associates in the latter 
stages of the tournament is one of the factors that bind them to the process.25 
The Tournament Model "Affiliated" to the World of the Large Law Firm 
Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, in their widely cited 1991 book Tournament o~ 
Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm,26 were the first to "affiliate" 7 
Tournament Theory to the study oflarge law frrms. 28 In order to explain why 
tournament theory might be of relevance to the study of the legal industry, they 
applied Gilson and Mnookin's work on agency and portfolio theories to the world of 
the large law firm. 29 Galanter and Palay claimed that, in order to mitigate agency 
I fi · . 30 costs, aw rms organise career progression as a tournament. 
The Tournament structure, in their view, evolved to cope with the difficulty of 
monitoring the output of junior lawyers. In other words, it evolved to mitigate 
potential agency costs. In this scenario, the incentive of partnership is so huge (a 
"super bonus") that associates work extremely hard with minimal supervision and 
are committed to producing quality work. 31 So, by adopting a tournament structure 
to govern career progression, law firms reduce the chances of their associates 
shirking in terms of both hours worked and the quality of work produced. Moreover, 
the prize of partnership by providing the lure of tenure, prestige and high salary32 
also serves to reduce the risk of the opportunistic behaviours of grabbing and/or 
leaving while still an associate. 33 
23 Considered further at page 9 of this work. 
24 Gilson and Mnookin (1985), op. cit., n. 14, p. 375 citing Amatrya Sen, 'Rational Fools, A Critique 
of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory' (1997) 6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 317; 
and Brill, ' Toward a New Excellence, Strategies and Values for Tomorrow's Successful Firms' 
(1983) AM Law November 31. 
25 Galanter and Palay, op. cit., n. 3, p. 97. 
26 University of Chicago Press 1991. 
27 Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, 'A Little Jousting About the Big Law Firm Tournament' (1998) 
84 Virginia Law Rev. 1683. The idea of "affiliation" rather than rigid application of a finite and fixed 
set of rules is of significance when I come to consider the critiques ofGalanter and Palay's work and 
their responses to such critiq ues. 
28 Their particular area 0 f interest was in find ing an exp lanation of the growth of large law firms. 
29 Galanter and Palay, op . cit. , n. 3, p. 94. 
30 id ., p. 100. They consider that inevitable by-products of using tournaments to mitigate agency costs 
are a need for continual growth , (via partner promotions and associate hires) and many of the 
characterist ics of career progression in large fimls . 
31 id., pp. 99,100. 
32 Bruce M Price , op. c it., n. 4. 
33 Galanter and Palay, op . cit. , n. 3, p. 100 . 
- 7 -
Galanter and Palay posit that the "stylised" rules of the tournament are as follows: 34 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
It is played over fixed period of time; 
All associates in an "entering class" compete for the prize of partnership; 
The prize is awarded to a fixed percentage of the top associates; 
The basis on which the award is made is the associates ' ranking - judged 
subjectively - in the possession of two goods: 
• High quality legal work ; and 
• Their own human capital ;35 
The winners get a guaranteed and fixed amount of compensation - regardless of 
who wins ; 36 and 
Associates are reassured that the firm is keeping its side of the bar9ain through: 
• consistent and readily observable partner promotion rates;3 and 
• the continued hiring of new associates.38 
Tournament Theory and Law Firms - The Critiques 
Galanter and Palay' s work has been widely considered, critiqued and applied. It is 
important, for the purposes of the Research Question, to carry out a detailed review 
here of these works in order to understand the evolution and current validity of the 
tournament model and its applicability to large law firms. This second section of 
Part II contains that review. 
For a minority ofwriters39 tournament theory has no application to the institutional 
structures of large law firms. The majority of those who have reviewed Galanter and 
Palay's work draw attention to specific aspects of tournament theory, as applied to 
large law firms that do not seem to work satisfactorily or to perceived gaps in the 
model ' s coverage. Wilkins and Gulati £rovide the most extensive and constructive 
critique ofGalanter and Palay' s work. 0 After considering some of the more general 
34 id. , p. 100. See also by same auth ors, ' Large Law Firm M isery, It's the Tournament, not the 
Money' (1999) 52 Vand erbilt Law Rev iew 953 , fo r a succ in ct ex position of the rules . 
35 The extent to which an indiv idua l is able to demonstrate thei r (and potentiall y their department's or 
group 's) accumulation of capita l is often embodied in the "business case" submitted as part of the 
documentation in support of an assoc iate's proposa l for promotion to partnership . 
36 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit ., n. 3, p. 101 . In e ffec t the firm commits to setting aside a prescribed 
amount of remlmeration. 
37 id. , p. 101 . For a view disputing Ga lanter and Palay's empir ica l analysis see Kordana, op. c it. , n. 8, 
E· I 92 1. 
8 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 3, p. 101 . To feed th e pipe line of human resource that fi lls the gaps 
left in assoc iate ranks by those promoted to partner (and those who leave having not made it) and to 
add the req uired leverage tha t makes the business profitable . See a lso D av id Ma ister, Managing the 
Professional Service Firm (2003) . 
39 George Ruth erglen and Kev in Ko rdana, ' A Fa rewe ll to Tournaments? The need for an Alte rnative 
Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth ' ( 1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1695 and Kordana, 
op. cit. , n. 8 . See also Tom G insburg and Jeffrey A Wolf, 'The Market for Elite Law Firm Assoc iates ' 
(2004) 3 1 Florida State Unjvers ity Law Rev. 909 , considered further at page 20 of this work . 
40 Wilkins and Gulati, op. cit. , n. 3 . 
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critiques I will consider, in some detail, their main points and Galanter and Palay's 
response. 
According to Kordana and Rutherglen tournament theory is not applicable to law 
firms. 4 1 Their central claim is that the output of lawyers is neither difficult nor 
costly to monitor and, therefore, the fundamental reason for tournament theory's 
relevance to large law firms is undermined. 42 Instead, they argue that client demands 
and the type of work conducted by law fIrms are better explanatory factors of the 
growth and internal structures of large law firms . 43 They say it is easy to monitor 
lawyer output due to the close supervision of this output by more senior lawyers, 
while hours worked are also recorded zealously by all lawyers. Further, they claim 
that it is inexpensive to monitor lawyer output, as the supervising lawyers will 
charge the client for the time spent on monitoring.44 
Wilkins and Gulati take a contrary view, noting that within the context of an 
environment where extremely tight deadlines are the norm and where the 
opportunity costs of partners spending time away from fee generation and business 
development are significant, 45 a firm has a disincentive to engage in anything but 
essential monitoring. 46 Moreover, they contend that: 
• a document being reviewed by a senior lawyer in this way will be the work 
product of a number of more junior lawyers and, therefore, it is difficult for the 
supervisor to be sure whose work s/he is monitoring; 47 and 
• for other types of work where the exercise of judgement is called for, such as 
legal research, a more senior lawyer will find it difficult and time-consuming to 
monitor the ~uality of the work without having to do the work again 
thernselves. 4 
In considering recorded hours as a basis for monitoring a lawyer' s output Galanter 
and Palay point out that time spent on a task gives no indication of the quality or 
value of the output achieved during that time period. 49 The renowned practices of 
4 1 Rutherglen and Kordana, op . cit. , n. 39; and Kordana, op . c it., n. 8. 
42 Kordana, op. c it. , n. 8 , p. 19 14 . 
43 id ., pp . 1923 - 1933. See also Vincent Robert Johnson, ' On Shared Human Capital, Promotion 
Tournaments and Exponential Law Firm Growth ' (1 99 1) 70 Texas Law Rev. 537; and Frederick W 
Lambert , 'An Academic V isit to the Modern Law Firm: Considering a Theory o f Promotion-Driven 
Growth ' ( 1992)90 Michigan Law Rev. 17 19 . 
44 Kordana, op. cit. , n. 8, pp . 1914 - 19 17. Price seems to back up Kordana's po int regarding the close 
supervision of lawyers, see Price, op. cit ., n . 4 , pp . 8-9 . Though it must also be borne in mind that this 
close monitoring will only last until such tim e as th e assoc iate is co mpetent at thi s new type of work . 
Thereafter it is usua l fo r such work to be monitored in a cursory fashion, if at all. 
45 Wilkins and Gulati , op . cit. , n. 3, p. 1600. 
46 Any organizationa l structure that obviates th e need fo r anything but essentia l monitoring will be an 
attrac tive option for law firm s. This also has clear implications for skill and ca reer deve lopment 
opportuniti es fo r lawyers. 
47 Wilkins and Gulati , id ., p. 1597 . 
48 id ., p. 1599 . 
49 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 3, p. 96 . 
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under- and over-recording also should be taken into account as calling into question 
the accuracy of time records. 50 
Kordana also disputes Galanter and Palay's empirical findings that a "stable 
percentage" of associates are promoted to partner each year. He criticises the data 
Galanter and Palay use on the basis that they fail to take into account those in an 
"entering class" who leave the firm and that they include associates belong to other 
classes. This leads him to conclude that: 
Considering the appropriate data - the percentage of a given incoming class 
that makes partner - one fmds that firms do not have a flXed promotion rate. 
Instead, the percentage of each cohort that makes partner varies 
dramatically. 51 
Given the subject matter of the Research Question this is a particularly pertinent 
criticism and one that I deal with at the conclusion of this part of the thesis .52 
Other commentators, while not dismissing the applicability of the work, have also 
pointed out factors that, in their view, Galanter and Palay failed to consider or did 
not adequately address. These include: 
• the importance of internal power structures and politics in partnership promotion 
d . . 53 eClslons ; 
• the impact of external economic forces on the ability of law firms to promote a 
fixed percentage of associates to partnership each year;54 and 
• the significance of firm mergers and lateral hiring of associates and partners on 
the prospects of associates making partner. 55 
Insofar as these critiques impact upon the Research Question I will consider them 
more closely at the end of this part of the thesis. 56 
Reconceiving the Tournament- Wilkins and Gulati 
This brings me to the most in-depth critique produced to date ofGalanter and 
Palay's application of tournament theory to law firms, that of Wilkins and Gulati. 57 I 
50 Evidence of how difficult it is to decipher the content of time recordings can be found at any 
contested costs hearing in the English Courts. 
51 Kordana, op. cit., n. 8 , pp. 1921 - 1922. Though also see Wilkins and Gulati , op . cit., n. 3, p . 1603 
for their view on promotion percentages . 
52 Considered at page 24 of thi s work , footnote 142. 
53 Robert L Nelson, 'Of Tournaments and Transformations : Ex plaining the Growth of Large Law 
Firms' (1992) Wisconsin Law Rev. 733 pp . 748-9; Johnson, op. cit. , n. 43 p. 537 and Rutherglen and 
Kordana , op . cit., n. 39. See also Wilkins and Gulati, op. cit. , n. 3. 
54 Johnson, op. cit., n. 43 and Kordana, op. cit. , n. 8. 
55 Johnson, op . cit., n. 43. 
56 See also Morris and Pinnington , op. cit. , n. 4. for research in the context of UK law ftrms, 
considered further at page 19 of thi s work. 
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start with a review of this work and then go on to consider Galanter and Palay's 
response, which was produced for the same Symposium in 1998.58 Their response 
also deals with the "omissions" referred to above,59 many of which are also to be 
found in Wilkins and Gulati's work. 
It is worth starting by setting out Wilkins and Gulati 's conclusion, that: 
Although basic tournament theory does not adequately explain the structure 
and operation of contemporary elite fIrms the competitive aspect that the 
tournament model captures is a vital building block for constructing a more 
nuanced model of the large law fIrm. 60 
This provides an important acknowledgement of the signifIcance of tournament 
theory to the analysis of large law fum structure, a point which can be lost when 
considering their many criticisms ofGalanter and Palay's work. 61 
Seven Grounds of Criticism 
Wilkins and Gulati level seven main criticisms. 
1. Not everyone is competing in the tournament - Wilkins and Gulati rely on 
evidence oflawyers ' attitudes in the early part of their training/careers62 to back up 
their argument. They contend that in the early stages of a lawyer 's career some other 
means
63 
are needed to provide motivation and limit monitoring costs and to identify 
those who are competing. 64 
2. There is not a level playing field - Some associates will be more favoured than 
others due to the fact that they will have mentors who: 
• are politically powerful within the firm; 
S7 Wilkins and Gulati, op. cit., n. 3. 
S8 Wilkins and Gulati op . cit., n 27. 
S9 Considered further at page 18 of this work. 
60 Wilkins and Gulati op . cit., n. 3, pp . 1632 and 1634, where they suggest the tournament casts a 
"shadow" over the working practices of lawyers not competing in the tournament and see se nior 
assoc iates as "locked in a competition that resembles a tournament". 
61 That s ignificance is und erlined in the use they make of the tournament in their ear li er work David 
B Wilkins and G Mitu Gulat i, ' Why are there so Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Finns? An 
institutional Analys is' (1996) 84 Californ ia Law Rev. 493 ; and the recent work ofMi tu Gulati et a l 
that , though critical of the app licabi lity of standard tournament theory, further deve lops its application 
oftournament theory in the large law firm context, Scott Baker, Stephen J Choi and Mitu Gu lati , ' The 
Rat Race as an lnfoml ation-forc ing Dev ice' (2006) 8 1 Indiana Law Journal 53 . 
62 Wilkins and Gulati op. cit., n. 3, p. 1606, cit ing Robert Granfie ld , Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of 
Law at Harvard and Beyond (1992). 
63 Considered further at page 14 of this work. 
64 Stephen 1. Doggett , 'Assistant Survey' , Legal Business, November 2006 issue 169 . The survey 
discovered th at just under two thirds of the 2,186 assistants surveyed found the idea of being a partner 
atb-active. 
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• provide them with beneficial "training work"; 
• protect them from work which provides no benefit to their career progression;65 
and 
• push for their promotion to partner. 
Associates fortunate enough to be in such a position are likely to get more than their 
fair share of "training work" and correspondingly less routine "paper work". 
The concepts of"training work" and "paper work" are potentially important for 
analysing the pattern of work assignments experienced by associates in the run-up to 
partnership promotion decisions. Of relevance to the Research Question will be 
which work assignments provided associates with information on their chances of 
making partner. 
Training work is the type of work that will help an associate develop their own 
human capital, as it is likely to be high profile and closely supervised. It allows an 
associate to display abilities that are important for partners to possess to a greater 
extent than if they were to work primarily on routine "paper work" matters. This 
means the associate is more likely to be noticed, placed on the training "track,,66 and 
to be considered as someone with partnership potential. 67 
According to Wilkins and Gulati, once a material level of training work has been 
provided to an associate and successfully completed the recipient is likely to 
continue to receive significant levels of training work and the associated partner 
attention/supervision.68 Due to the expense of partner supervision and the resulting 
reluctance to monitor junior lawyers any more than is necessary, this will continue to 
be the case even if those who receive no, or minimal, levels oftraining work have 
the skills and aptitudes to make better partners. In other words, in their view, once an 
associate is seen to be a potential partner they are highly likely to remain on that 
"track" .69 In addition, Wilkins and Gulati suggest that firms "seed" those recruits 
that are believed to be "especially valuable" directly onto the "training track".70 
65 That is, undul y high levels of "paper work". 
66 Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1646. 
67 id. , p. 16 10, the ir analys is sees the human capital accumulated fro m tra ining work as of three typ es: 
genera l; fi rm specific ; and re lational. With " relational capita l" being th e development of strong 
re lationships with partners who will g ive them good wo rk "pass on important client re lationsh ip s, and 
ultimately push fo r the ir p romotion" . Their view is that "paper work" ass ignments can give rise to the 
creation of general and firm spec ifi c hWllan ca pital but such tasks are unlikely to generate relationa l 
capita l o r to allow assoc iates to exhibit the skills and attributes "that partners look for when 
eva luating assoc iates fo r partnership ." 
68 id ., pp . 1645 - 1647 . 
69 id ., p. 1647. 
70 id ., pp. 1653 - 1654 . The "especiall y va luab le" recrui ts th ey refer to are those at the ""superstar" 
end of the academic distribution" . 
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3. There is no material evidence of sabotage by lawyers of their co-competitor 
colleagues' work and/or career progression 71 - This runs contrary to general 
tournament theory and is the more remarkable according to Wilkins and Gulati 
because lawyers, who often work in teams, have plentiful opportunities to engage in 
such behaviour. 72 
4 . The political power of the partner(s) supporting a particular associate will have a 
significant impact on that associate's chances of making partner73 - This means that 
not necessarily the best lawyers will be chosen as partners. Partners are likely to 
promote only those associates on whom they can rely to support them and reinforce 
their political power base in the future. Associates will, in tum, have an incentive to 
seek work only from powerful partners and not from those who carry little political 
weight. 74 The self reinforcing provision of career enhancing "training work" will 
also be encouraged in this scenario with partners tending to provide such work to 
those who are "most likely to provide direct benefit to their practices". 75 
Clearly, these factors may lead to behaviour that is not in the best interests of the 
firm. 
5. There is very little evidence that partners "shirk " even though there is little or no 
direct monitoring of their output.76 
6. Firms select partners on their future potential as partners and not on past 
p erformance - This runs contrary to standard tournament theory where selection of 
the prize-winner is based solely on past performance. 77 Wilkins and Gulati rely on 
evidence that shows partners value hours worked as of only limited significance in 
deciding whether an associate has the makings of a successful partner. 78 
71 There ma y be a simple explanation for this in that, lawyers, other than tra inees, working in teams 
will se ldom be at th e same level of qualification as others in the team. 
72 id ., p. 1614. 
73 id. , p. 16 13 , "Partners are not neutral umpires." Nelson, op . cit. , n. 53 and Johnson , op . cit. , n. 43, 
leve l similar critic isms. 
74 This scenario has paralle ls with the situations analysed by Gulati et a I, op . cit. , n. 6 1, p. 9 . 
According to their work on the partnership promotion decision making process " the more discretion 
decision-makers have, the greater the incentives of the lower leve l employees to engage in influence 
activities - that is, paying rents to and garnerin g favour with th e agen ts in control - and this 
potentia lly benefi ts th e controlling agents to a greater extent than a system in which the promotion 
criteria are more transparent. " 
7S Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 16 17 . 
76 id. , p. 16 19. 
77 This critici sm is developed by Gulati et ai, op . cit. , n. 61. They propose that the long hours worked 
by assoc iates are significant, not in themselves, but because they provide co ncrete performance 
information (that is, how assoc iates reac t lmder the pressure and stress of long hours - thus laying 
bare the ir tru e abilities) which is used to g ive an indication of future potentia l. 
78 Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1596, citing Renee M Landers, James B Rebitzer and Lowell J 
Taylor, ' Rat Race Redux, Adverse Se lection Tn The Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms' 
( 1996) 86 American Economic Rev. 329. However, if their enquiry had been phrased a long th e lines 
of: "Would you cons ider for partnership an assoc iate who has no record of achieving high billable 
hours?" They might we ll have come to a different conclus ion on the importance of high billable hours 
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7. Selection is not transparent and associates lack the ability to monitor the 
promotion to partnership promises made by the firm 79 - Wilkins and Gulati maintain 
that the partner "make-up" percentage is neither clear nor credible enough to 
reassure associates that the fIrm is fulfIlling its obligations. 80 Further, law fIrms ' 
partnership promotion processes and criteria are opaque and cannot be relied upon as 
to be fair. 81 
Multiple Incentives - Not just the Tournament 
Wilkins and Gulati then provide suggestions as to the structures and processes that 
fIrms use, in addition to the tournament, to mitigate agency costs for lawyers at 
levels below senior associate. In their words, in order to extract high levels of effort 
from their lawyers: 
elite fIrms pursue a multiple incentive strategy. Consistent with tournament 
theory, fIrms continue to hope that some lawyers will be motivated by the 
chance of making partner. For those who are not, fIrms create additional 
incentives through high wages, reputational bonds and the promise of general 
training. Moreover, these four incentive systems [including the tournament] 
are interconnected. The less credible a fIrm's partnership promises, the more 
it is like7 to rely on high wages or promises of providing valuable external 
signals.8 
The predictions Wilkins and Gulati make in this area are crucial to the unpacking of 
the Research Question. If the predictions are correct, one would expect the research 
data to support the fact that these other incentives exist and have played a part in 
motivating associates. In such a scenario the periods during which they provide 
motivational incentives will be highly significant for the Research Question as it will 
only be at the point when the tournament becomes a material motivating factor that 
an associate 's ability to monitor the fIrm 's promotion percentage will become 
signifIcant. At any g iven time, if other incentives are providing suffIcient motivation 
for the associate to expend high levels of quality effort , the rules of the tournament 
and other factors associated with it are immaterial. 
in making promotions to partner. The conclusion derived fro m asking this question wo uld certainly 
g ive rise to a d iffe rent conclusion ifG ulati et a i, op . c it. , n . 6 1 is to be believed. While the hours 
worked, of th emselves may be un important, as an ind icator of partnersh ip potentia l, the behav iour 
observed durin g the long hours is, in the ir view, cru cial. 
79 Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1624. 
80 id. , pp. 1623 - 1624 . 
81 id. , pp. 1626 and 1667 - 1668. They refer to the partner promotion process as a " Black Box" and 
contend that an interesting by-product is that the opacity in relation to promotion criteri a means that 
se nior associates ca nnot te ll which areas the partners rea ll y va lue in mak ing up new partners. So, the 
se nior assoc iate is incentiv ised to work hard in a ll areas thereby bring ing extra va lue to th e firm. The 
tournament, on th is view, seems to produce be ne fic ia l output as a by-product of th e fir m not 
manag ing the ir emp loyees and hav ing them ex ist in a state 0 f uncerta inty and without guidance. 
82 id ., p. 1635 . 
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I will consider Wilkins and Gulati' s views on each of High Wages, Reputational 
Bonds and General Training before outlining their views on the significance ofthe 
tournament for junior lawyers. 
High Wages 83- Lawyers' relatively high wages create a large pool of people 
qualified and competent to do the job which, in tum, motivates those in the jobs to 
work hard with little supervision as they know the firm would be able to hire willing 
and able replacements if they do not do so . 
Reputational Bonds&4 - Such bonds exist where the fact that a lawyer has trained 
and/or worked at an elite law firm is taken by the market as a signal that skills that 
are hard to observe in the hiring process have been acquired by that lawyer. Thus it 
is easier for that lawyer to secure future employment outside their existing fmn. 
Courtesy of this reputational bond the lawyer ensures that the educational and other 
human capital in which they have invested to date is at least preserved while they 
work for the large firm, irrespective of actual performance. 
However, the existence of the reputational bond is something ofa double-edged 
sword in that the "terminating" of a lawyer from their employment sends such a 
negative signal to potential future employers that the value built through previous 
investment in human capital may well be destroyed. This provides a hefty incentive 
for the lawyer to work hard without significant levels of supervision. 85 
General Training - As opposed to firm specific training,86 general training is a 
commodity that junior lawyers need and seek out in order to add to their stock of 
readily transferable human capital. Their increased human capital can then be 
utilised in the securing of and performance in future jobs. 87 They will work hard to 
preserve the opportunity of receiving this general training. 
83 id ., p. 1636 citing Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 
( 1992) wages that are higher than effi ciency wages (that is, the wage that yo u would be prepared to 
do the job for). 
84 Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1640. 
85 Some interesting by-products may result: 
a. [f some associates are motivated to ex treme efforts by the tournament - for ex amp Ie, extreme 
leve ls of billable hours worked - does that mean that those only interested in preserv ing the 
reputational bond ofthe ir employment are fo rced to adopt the sta ndards set by those in the 
tow·nament? See Wilkins and G ulati id ., p . 1632, fo r reference to " the shadow of the tournament" 
and Galanter and Palay, op. cit ., n. 3, p. 1687. 
b. The ex iste nce of rep utationa I bonds provides a reason why lawyers might leave their fi rm prior to 
partnership dec is ions be in g made rather than be pushed out at some later point in time, see 
Wilkins and Gul ati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1633. Though in such circumstances query whether this 
might be just as detrimenta l to the signa l 0 f unobservab Ie sk ills acq uired as getting fired before 
the partnership dec isions are made? A lso see G ilson and Mnook in (1989) op . cit. , n. 14 , p. 567. 
86 id ., p. 1641. 
87 Allied to the benefi ts prov ided by the Reputational Bond . 
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Significance o/the tournament/or junior lawyers - The tournament ' s significance 
lies in the "tracking" behaviours outlined above. 88 As Wilkins and Gulati put it: 
elite firms cannot afford for every associate to be strongly motivated to win 
the [partnership] tournament. ... the kind of training work and relational 
capital that associates need to win the tournament are scarce commodities. If 
every associate were to compete fiercely to acquire these goods, firms would 
have to expend substantial resources to guard against sabotage and other 
forms of costly strategic behaviour by associates.89 
All four incentives are interconnected; the less credible a firm's partnership 
promises the more likely it is to rely on the other incentives.90 The other incentives 
in play act to maintain a profitable number of associates in the firm's work force 
until such time as the tournament takes over as the primary motivational factor or 
they leave the firm. 91 
Galanter and Palay Respond 
Galanter and Palay' s response to Wilkins and Gulati's critique is to embrace it as an 
" incisive and illuminating elaboration of our picture of the large law firm.,, 92 It is, in 
their view, a piece that adds contemporary context and depth to their own work. 
Galanter and Palay' s view is that their version of Tournament theory as applied to 
law firms is well able to accommodate Wilkins and Gulati ' s criticisms. They point 
out that Tournament of Lawyers contained: 
two levels of description. First there is the stripped-down skeletal description 
that is used in the tournament model [and second the] more contextualised, 
fleshed-out account of the big firm. 93 
They go on to suggest that: 
Many supposed differences between "our" tournament and that envisioned by 
David and Mitu seem to arise from the conflation [by Wilkins and Gulati] of 
these two levels of description. 94 
They see Wilkins and Gulati 's work as providing a more in-depth description and 
contextualisation of how the big law firm may operate the tournament but they: 
88 id. , p. 1647 , potentia ll y also the "seeding" phenomenon they outline. See a lso potential impact of 
imported work standards fro m the tournament at footnote 85a of this work . 
89 id .,p. 1635. 
90 id ., p. 1635. 
91 The smaller the poo l of potential partners the greater the amount of training work members of th at 
poo l can be provided with . Consequentl y they should accumulate corresponding amounts of relational 
ca pita l, which w ill better equip that sma ll pool to make partner. 
92 Ga lanteI' and Palay, op. cit. , n. 27, p . 1687. 
93 id. , p. 1692, citing Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit., n. 3, pp . 77- 120 . 
94 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 27 , p. 1692 . 
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do not think, however, that their richer account requires modification of the 
core of the tournament story. 95 
The "core" they refer to is the "deal" struck between the firm and its associates that 
the associates will work diligently in producing a large volume of high quality legal 
work for the firm's clients, in return for entry into the promotion to partner 
tournament. Developing this theme,96 they see the tournament as "a cluster of 
devices" that serves to provide an institutionalised environment for enforcing the 
deal. 97 They contend that different combinations of the tournament 's "devices" will 
be observable in large law firm situations over time. As they put it, "A rough 
approximation" of the rules has always been enough to act as evidence ofa 
tournament existing and "that approximation has varied over time".98 
As a general matter, Galanter and Palay see the criticisms levelled at them by 
Wilkins and Gulati as based on a series of assumptions about conditions that, though 
often present when tournaments exist, are not, "descriptions of specific conditions 
necessary for a tournament".99 This relates back to Galanter and Palay' s point, noted 
above, about the conflation by Wilkins and Gulati of the two separate levels of 
analysis of the tournament presented in Tournament of Lawyers. This general point 
is important to bear in mind when considering Wilkins and Gulati ' s sRecific 
criticisms and Galanter and Palay's responses, which I set out below. 00 For 
convenience, I adopt Wilkins and Gulati 's numbering . 
I. No t everyone is competing in the tournament - Galanter and Palay state that there 
was "probably always some of this " though possibly "more today than there used to 
be". lol They further describe it as a "second-order phenomenon,,102 that is likely to 
arise whenever individuals are able to exploit a set of circumstances to their own 
ends . In such cases, "Associates may join a law firm seeking money, training, or 
credentials." 103 
2. There is not a level playing field - Again, Galanter and Palay see this as nothing 
new and also not entirely surprising. Wilkins and Gulati contend that Galanter and 
95 id ., p. 1690 . 
96 In effect they co-opt Wilkins and Gulati ' s multiple incentives to the ir tournament. 
97 That is, an institutiona l structure th at mitigates the potential agenc y costs assoc iated with shar ing 
the clients ' work w ith assoc iates . 
98 id. , p. 1692 . 
99 id ., p. 1692. 
100 id., p . 1686, Galanter and Pa lay refer to the specifi c criti cisms as " ... a useful cata logue of features 
of the firm that have bee n little noted ." 
101 id., p. 1687 . 
102 id., p . 1687. 
103 id. , p. 1687. They then go on to add a point that has potentia l significa nce as an area fo r further 
research, name ly that: "They may not be co mp eting in the to urnament, but, nevertheless, we sllspect 
that in importa nt respects they are expected to (and do) act as if they were com peting ." See also page 
15 of thi s work, footno te 8Sa , regarding the " shadow" cast by the tournament over th e working habits 
of those lawyers who are not competing in it. 
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Palayemphasised in Tournament of Lawyers that "associates can be confident that 
partnership decisions [are] being made on the basis of merit". 104 However, Galanter 
and Palay see this as an inaccurate reflection of their work. Instead of being 
concerned with promotions on the basis of merit, Galanter and Palay say they are 
concerned with "devices that maximise associates' incentives to produce lots of what 
partners want." They stress that the associates' final standing in the tournament is 
based on output that is "measured subjectively, not mechanistically". 105 
3. No material evidence ofsabotage by lawyers - Galanter and Palay are silent on 
this point. 
4. Impact of the political power of partners on the promotion decision - Galanter 
and Palay consider that various factors that impact on the promotion decision have 
been ever present in the world of the large law firm. In this category they place: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
patronage by politically powerful partners; 
business winning abilities of the associates; 
fluctuations in demand for legal services; and 
ffi . f' I . I ' 106 sta mg requrrements 0 partlcu ar speCIa ties. 
They go on to state that: 
The operation of a tournament does not require that these factors be 
abolished. It only requires that a significant portion ofa firm's associates 
have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules of the game and a 
reasonably accurate perception of the partners' desires. 107 
5. Little evidence that partners "shirk" despite lack of monitoring - Galanter and 
Palay feel that they addressed this very point in Tournament of Lawyers. They pomt 
out that in describing the " late big frrm" they anticipate the continual testing of 
partners, with the tournament extended into the partnership phase with partnership 
becoming: 
less of a plenary and permanent reward, necessitating the design of additional 
incentives for performance and loyalty.108 
6. Firms select partners on their future potential as partners and not on past 
performance - Galanter and Palay respond on this point , that their story: 
104 Galanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27, p. 1687 citing Wilkins and Gulati, op . cit. , n. 3, p . 1604 . 
105 Galanter and Palay, op . c it. , n. 27, p. 1687 citing Galanter and Palay, op. cit., n. 3, p . 100 . 
106 They make no exp licit reference to latera I hiring. 
107 Galanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 27, p. 1688. 
108 id ., p. 1689 citing Galanter and Palay, op . cit., n. 3 , p. 122. The incentives that partners have to 
retain their partnership status seem simi lar to those that junior lawyers have. That is they seek to 
preserve their "h igh wages" and " rep utationa l bonds" as well as taking part in tournaments if they are 
look ing fo r e levatio n within the firm's hierarchy (fo r examp le, seeking equity partnership or powerful 
positions). See also Wilkins and Gulati , op. c it. , n. 3 , pp . 1662 - 1664. 
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has always included an expectation that firms will promote those associates 
with the biggest bundle of human capital. The term "capital" does not refer to 
an accumulation of past merit , but rather to those attributes that can produce 
value in the future . 
They also make the axiomatic but, in this context, entirely valid observation that: 
While firm members who are selecting partners try to predict the future, the 
only thing on which they can judge the associates is the past. 109 
7. Selection is not transparent and associates lack the ability to monitor the 
promotion to partnership promises made by the firm - Again Galanter and Palay are 
of the view that lack of transparency is hardly a new phenomenon and the fact that 
the process lacks transparency has never precluded the existence of a tournament. 
They say nothing specific on associates ' abilities to monitor promotion to partner 
promises, although they note that: 
Compared to an earlier day, it would be hard to make the case that associates 
have less information about their standing and partnership prospects. II 0 
In this context it is certainly worthwhile repeating Galanter and Palay' s general 
statement that; in order for a tournament to operate, the required level of knowledge 
is that associates: 
have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules of the game and a 
reasonably accurate perception of the partners' desires. II J 
However, this still begs the question, do associates, in fact, have the requisite level 
of knowledge to be able to monitor the promotion to partnership promises made by 
the firm? 
Having dealt with many of Wilkins and Gulati 's main criticisms Galanter and Palay 
set out specific areas that Wilkins and Gulati have provided new and significant 
pieces of the tournament's jigsaw. 
David and Mitu make a number of important additions to our picture of the 
large firm - the distinction between "paper work" and "training work" the 
observation that associates (and partners) cultivate "relational capital" 1\2 
within the firm, their account of " tracking" and "seeding," and much else. 
They enlarge our understanding of how the tournament is contextually 
109 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27 , p . 1688 . 
11 0 id ., p. 1688 . 
I II id., p. 1688 . 
11 2 id., p . 1690 , Galanter and Pa lay see relational capita l as fa lling with in their broad category of 
human capital. 
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embedded in the American setting and provide a rich portrait of the 
micropolitics of the law firm. 113 
RecentApplications/Critiques of Tournament Theory in Law Firm Context 
Galanter and Palay's work has continued to be applied and critiqued from 1998 to 
date. For example, Morris and Pinnington, in their work on promotion practices in 
UK law fIrms, fInd the tournament model of career progression and promotion to 
partner prevalent in the largest UK law fIrms. 114 Bainbridge, in his work on legal 
ethics and the impact that the promotion to partnership tournament has on lawyers 
ability to "whistle blow" on their clients, embraces tournament theory as a means of 
explaining why lawyers are unlikely to report actual or potential contraventions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. II S He notes that senior associates are those most likely to be 
embroiled in the tournament, 11 6 and: 
it is precisely senior associates who often have the sort of client contact in 
which potential misconduct may come to light.11 7 
However, due to the tournament 's need for them to please clients they are some of 
the least likely people to report this information. 
Price, meanwhile, considers the impact on Silicon Valley law firms of extreme 
market conditions during the dot-com bubble of the 1990s. 118 SpecifIcally, he 
considers how those conditions affect the ability of the tournament model to control 
opportunistic behaviour by associates. In his conclusion he notes that: 
the tournament seems to have worked as a disincentive to engage in 
opportunistic behaviours by the most senior associates and partners. From 
the literature on tournament theory, the cohort of associates most likely to be 
actively engaged in the tournament, and most disinclined to engage in 
opportunistic behaviours, is senior associates. I 19 
A recent dissenting note comes from Ginsburg and Wolf in 2004. 120 Although their 
article is largely concerned with other matters to do with recruiting associates into 
11 3 id., p. 1690. 
11 4 Morris and Pinnington, op . cit., n. 4. Interestingly, the ir evidence suggests that outside the larger 
firms "up or out" is not a common promotion practice. They see th e absence of "up or out" in these 
firms as an indication that no tournam ent ex ists in such cases. 
11 5 Bainbridge, op . c it. , n. 4, p 14. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is American legislation passed in th e wake 
of the co llapse of Enron . [t deals with, among other things, the general duties of care owed by those 
~roviding companies with lega l, accounting and co nsulting services. 
16 id., p. 14 citing Wilkins and Gulati , op . cit. , n. 3 . 
11 7 Bainbridge, op . cit. , n. 4, p14 . 
11 8 Price op . cit. , n. 4 . 
11 9 id., p. 16 citing Wilkins and Gulati , op . c it. , n. 3 , p . 1633 . 
120 Ginsburg and Wolf, op . c it. , n. 39. 
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law fIrms, as regards tournament theory they prefer the view that law fIrms merely 
seem to exhibit the characteristics of a tournament: 
Firms do not choose to structure a tournament; rather, the attrition model [of 
associate recruitment] of the current large law firm may in part be forced 
upon them by the market in which they participate, and this model merely 
. I h f 121 slmu ates t e appearance 0 a tournament. 
Ginsburg and Wolf consider that these seeming characteristics of a tournament "may 
stem from the difficulty of predicting a lawyer's fit prior to his or her beginning with 
the fmn.,, 122 They go on to consider works of Wilkins and Gulati 123 and state that 
they provide an excellent response and "direct rebuttal to Galanter and Palay". 124 
As noted above, though Wilkins and Gulati's work contains cogent criticisms of 
Galanter and Palay' s application of tournament theory to large law firms they 
(Wilkins and Gulati) remain of the opinion that a tournament exists in law firms , 
albeit confmed to the ranks of senior associates. 125 
In 2006 Baker, Choi and Gulati posit that in law firms the partnership promotion 
process consists of a two round "Revelation Tournament" . 126 Associates qualify for 
the second round of the tournament (the promotion to partnership decision) based on 
accumulation of billable hours. The crucial revelation of the fIrst round is the 
information that the fIrm discovers about a lawyer ' s true abilities by placing them 
under the stress of long hours. 
Their main criticism of tournament theory as it applies to law fmns is that: 
standard tournament theory, fails to capture the realities and nuances of most 
I fi . d .. 127 aw Ifm promotion eClSlOns 
They claim that, contrary to the standard theory, 128 associates are not judged for the 
purpose of promotion on objective bases, rather: 
12 1 id., p . 960 . 
122 id., p. 959 . 
123 Wilkins and Gulati , op. c it. , n. 3 , and , op. c it. , n. 6 1. 
124 Ginsburg and Wolf, op . c it. , n . 39, p 960 . 
125 In fact, th e attrition mode I and the "d ifficulty of predictin g a lawyer's fit" before they join the fi nn 
sits well w ith Wilkins and Gulat i's nuanced model of the tournament. Junior lawyers, in the ir view, 
are motiva ted by a variety of fac tors up to the po int when they and th e firm decide there is a "fit" and 
the associates throw themselves headlong into th e tournament. 
126 Gulati e t a I, op. c it. , n. 6 1. 
127 id. , p. 13. 
128 By which [ take them to mean the works of Ga lanter and Pa lay as they are the onl y authors to have 
applied the theory to the world of the law firm in a comprehensive manner and in something 
resembling its standard form. Though see Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27 , p. 1684 for their view of 
hav ing the app lication of "standard " tournament theory ascribed to them. 
- 21 -
it is unclear grecisely what the associate needs to do to "win" the 
tournament. 29 
This criticism of "standard tournament theory" as applied to law firms should be 
read, however, in the light of Tournament of Lawyers, where Galanter and Palay are 
at pains to stress that the prize of partnership is awarded on the basis of associates' 
possession of two goods: high quality legal work; and their own human capital, 
judged subjectively. 130 
Conclusion - The Rules of the Tournament Revisited 
The aim of this third section of Part II is to draw together the elements of tournament 
theory that are of direct relevance to the Research Question. First 1 deal with those 
areas of tournament theory applicable to law firms where there appears to be a broad 
consensus. Then I set out the propositions that have some evidential basis but require 
further testing and validation. Finally, I consider the elements of tournament theory 
that give rise to propositions that have not, to date , been considered in any detail. 
That is, the areas relevant to the Research Question that pose unanswered questions. 
Areas of Broad Consensus 
A partnership promotion tournament exists for senior associates - Bainbridge and 
Price both explicitly adopt Wilkins and Gulati ' s proposition and give examples of 
the effect that the tournament has on the participants, specifically: a reluctance to 
"whistle blow" on clients (Bainbridge)1 3 ; and a disincentive to indulge in 
opportunistic behaviours (price) l32. In addition, Tournament of Lawyers contains 
reasoning that might support the notion that the tournament is a device most relevant 
to senior assistants. In the context of agency costs, the particular concerns that 
Galanter and Palay ascribe to partners who lend their capital to associates appear to 
be specific to senior associates rather than their junior counterparts. 133 They envisage 
that the lending partners will be concerned that their associates will: 
• 
• 
• 
demand more money in return for their labour by threatening to leave and take 
clients with them; 
leave and be difficult and eXfensive to replace, regardless of whether or not they 
are taking cl ients with them; 34 and 
damage the partners'/ frrm 's reputation by performing poorly or, worse, 
dishonestly. 
129 Gulati e t a i, op . c it. , n. 6 1 , p . 14 . 
130 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it ., n. 3, p . 100 and repeated later in Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27, p. 
1687, emphasis add ed. 
131 Bainbridge, op . c it. , n. 4 , p14. 
132 Price op. cit. , n. 4 , p. 16. 
133 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 3, pp . 95 - 96. 
134 The costs here are threefo ld: I . th e investment in tra ining the departing associate which has yet to 
be recouped; 2 . the time and money cost of finding a replacement; and 3. the cost of tra ining that 
replacement. 
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All of these concerns will be most acute in the case of senior associates. The 
significant levels of client contact and trust that make lawyers hard to replace and 
give them opportunities to lure clients away or ruin their firms ' reputations are the 
f · . 135 0 I . M . d P" , k 136 . preserve 0 senior associates. ver aymg orrls an mrungton s wor , as It 
relates to large law ftrms in the UK, allows a conclusion that a tournament exists 
within large UK law firms, at least , once senior associate level is reached. 
The partnership promotion decision-making process is opaque - There seems to be 
little difference of opinion between Galanter and Palay and those who criticise them 
on this issue. Indeed, not only is it common ground that the process is opaque but 
also that promotion decisions are based on subjective judgments of ability, potential 
and surrounding internal and external economic factors . Additional common ground 
is that such decisions are heavily affected by the levels of political power and 
influence wielded and exercised by an associate 's supporters. 137 
Working Propositions Needing Further Testing138 
In this category I place some of the propositions advanced by Wilkins and Gulati in 
Reconceiving the Tournament, specifically: 
• "seeding" and "tracking" of associates ; 
• the distinction between "paper work" and "training work" assignments and the 
importance of the latter in the promotion to partner process ; and 
• the role that multiple incentives play, alongside the tournament, in motivating 
associates. 139 
If these propositions are valid I would expect the field research to be undertaken for 
this thesis to provide evidence of their existence. 
The importance oftraining work type assignments should playa part in an 
associate's analysis ofhis/her chances of making partner, as should the reinforcing 
factors of seeding and tracking. Likewise, evidence of the existence of multiple 
incentives should become apparent when considering at what point the promotion to 
135 Lndeed, a good working definition of "senior assoc iate" might be that they ex ist only if these risks 
attach to th eir performance and behav iour. 
136 Morris and Pinnington, op. cit., n. 4 . 
137 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it ., n. 27, p. 1689 and considered further at pages 13 and 18 of this work. 
138 I would also like to add to the propositions in thi s section th e notion from Gulati et ai, op. c it. , n. 
6 1, that billable hours act as an info rmation fo rcing dev ice as I find it makes intuitive sense . 
However, though it is a neat th eory it does not meet the criteria set fo r thi s section of hav ing "some 
ev identi al basis" . Perhaps it fi ts best within the category of unanswered questions about tournament 
theory. However, I shall not co nsider it nlrther in this Part II as it seems to be an untested hypothesis. 
139 Wi Ikins and Gulati , op. cit ., n. 3 . Ga lanter and Pa lay, op. cit. , n. 27 , p. 1695 see these propositions 
as providing " important additions to our picture of the large fi rm". Considered at page 19 of this 
work . 
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partner tournament becomes the prime motivational force for associates. Both are 
matters considered below. 
Some Unanswered Questions 
There are many aspects of tournament theory as it applies to large law firms that 
remain untested to any great degree. That is, in part, what gives this area much of its 
interest. However, this thesis has, of necessity, to be confined to those questions that 
are of direct relevance to the Research Question. The accumulated literature 
reviewed above has not subjected the Research Question set out in Part 1140 to 
anything other than theoretical scrutiny. Additionally, through performing this 
literature review, further questions related to the Research Question have become 
apparent, specifically: 
• When does the tournament become the prime motivating factor for associates?141 
• Who comprises the "entering class" of associates for the purposes of monitoring 
h· . ?142 partners Ip promotion rates. 
• If promotion percentage and continued hiring of junior lawyers are not the whole 
of the story, how do associates weigh up their chances of becoming a partner? 
Researching these questions should help answer the Research Question and shed 
some light on Galanter and Palay's general argument that , for a tournament to be 
effective, associates need only to : 
have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules of the game and a 
reasonably accurate perception of the partners' desires. 143 
Though the Research Question and those set out above are, as yet, unanswered, it is 
clear that the perceptions of those engaged in the tournament are crucial to its 
efficacy. Such perceptions are the subject matter of the field research outlined in Part 
III. 
140 That is, whether lawyers in large law firm s in the UK have the means by which th ey can monitor 
their finn s' implied promises that a fi xed percentage of them will be made up to partner in due 
co urse. 
141 Logically, until then the rules of th e tournament, inc luding the monitoring of partner promotion 
rate s, should be of I ittle or no relevance to the assoc iates. 
142 Give n that the "monitoring" is done by the associates themse lves, it is the perception of the 
assoc iates that is important in this context and not arid academic debate of which fi gures provide the 
"best" measure. 
143 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it ., n. 27, p. 1688. 
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Part One: Life 
XI 
MUCH madness is divinest sense 
To a discerning eye; 
Much sense the starkest madness. 
'T is the majority 
In this, as all , prevails. 
Assent, and you are sane; 
Demur,- you 're straightway dangerous, 
And handled with a chain. 
E ·1 D· k· 144 nu y lC mson 
Part III 
Research Methodology 
Aims of the field research 
The broad aim ofthe field research is to provide qualitative data regarding the 
perceptions of lawyers in large law firms operating in the UK in order to ascertain 
whether or not the rules of tournament theory, as they relate to promotion to 
partnership, hold true in the light of that data. In more detail, the aim of the research 
is to elicit qualitative data relevant to the Research Question set out in Part I, that is: 
This thesis seeks to identify whether or not the rules of tournament theory 
that focus on promotion to partnership hold true when set against real life 
experiences of lawyers in large law firms operating in the UK. Specifically, 
the question I seek to answer is, whether or not such lawyers have the means 
by which they can monitor their firm's implied promise that a fixed 
percentage of them will be made up to partner in due course? 
Further, the goal of the field research is to ensure that the qualitative data gathered 
addresses the questions that were generated as a result of performing the literature 
review. These questions, which were conceived with a view to testing the theoretical 
144 Emil y Dickinson, Complete Poems (1924). 
- 25 -
framework within which the Research Question is set, are summarised in the 
conclusion to Part II and are set out below for ease of reference. 
• When does the tournament become the prime motivating factor for associates? 
• Who comprises the "entering class" of associates for the purposes of monitoring 
partnership promotion rates? 
• If promotion percentage and continued hiring of junior lawyers are not the whole 
of the story, how do associates weigh up their chances of becoming a partner? 
The research data should also have the potential to shed light on two further aspects 
of tournament theory as applied to law firms. Though they are subsidiary to the main 
Research Question in terms of importance for this thesis, they may have significance 
for the context within which that question exists. 
First, the conclusion to Part II also posits that data generated by field research on the 
specific questions set out above could be expected to provide data on those areas 
referred to as "Propositions Needing Further Testing". Specifically they are: 
• the "seeding" and "tracking" of associates; 
• the distinction between "paper work" and "training work" assignments and the 
importance of the latter in the promotion to partner process; and 
• the role that multiple incentives play, alongside the tournament, in motivating 
and controlling the behaviour of associates. 
Second, the field data, in theory, should also support those propositions that are well 
settled among those commentators who have conducted research and ventured 
opinions in this area. The conclusion to Part II states that these areas of "broad 
consensus" are that: 
• A partnership promotion tournament exists for senior associates. 
• The partnership promotion decision-making process is opaque. 
The Realities of Gathering Data to Meet the Aims of the Field Research 
There are a number of challenges inherent in designing a research methodology that 
ensures that the data generated is as relevant as possible to the aims stated above. 
The two fundamental questions are easy enough to identify but harder to answer 
with precision. They are : 
• from what sources can I generate the qualitative data I am seeking; and 
• by what means can I elicit that information once the sources have been 
identified? 
The challenges presented by each potential answer to the questions will determine 
which research methodology I adopt. 
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The Sources 
The literature review revealed no research directly relevant to the key elements of 
the Research Question, that is, the perceptions of those involved in the promotion to 
partnership process. It is worth re-emphasising here that it is these perceptions that 
are fundamental to understanding whether the rules that are the subject matter of this 
thesis hold true. They are the aspects of life as a lawyer in large UK law firms that 
the field research needs to uncover. 145 
In the absence of relevant data on the perceptions oflawyers regarding their 
experience 0 f the promotion to partner process the only viable means of generating 
such data is to ask the lawyers themselves. This conclusion then begs the question: 
which lawyers should be approached? 
In deftning further who might comprise the relevant survey group I concluded that 
only those lawyers who had been through the full range of experiences thrown up by 
the promotion to partnership process would have the necessary knowledge to 
provide pertinent data. They would be the only individuals who knew how accurate 
their perceptions of their chances of making partner turned out to be. Unsurprisingly, 
the most readily identifiable individuals who have been through the promotion to 
partnership process are partners in law firms. 
Individuals who have been through the promotion to partnership process but who 
have not been promoted are difficult to identify. 146 Only those candidates who are 
seen to have a good chance 147 of making partnerl48 are put forward by their 
sponsoring departments/partners, since to do otherwise would mean: 
• expenditure of, high opportunity cost, partner time on individuals with relatively 
low chances of being promoted ;149 
145 Though industry surveys might be drawn upon to provide broad indications o f how lawyers fee l 
about their career prospects, for example the Legal Business Assistant Survey November 2006 
(Doggett, op . c it. , n. 64), none have specifica lly explored the perceptions of individual lawyers who 
have experienced th e promotion to partner process and certa inly none have done so as a means of 
highlighting the role that tournament theory might play in the way law firms are organi sed. 
146 Such assoc iates are unlikely to w ish to broadcast information that shows th em in a poor light , see 
G ilson and Mnookin (1989), op . cit. , n. 14 , p. 567 . 
147 Just how good a lawyer 's chance of making partner must be before they are put through the PPP 
will vary between firms. It should be noted here that having a "good chance" does not necessarily 
mean that the indiv idual w ill be made partner the first time that they go through the process, rather 
that th ey w ill be very likely to make partner in due course which may be after one or more times 
th ro ugh the who le process. Anecdota l ev idence suggests that some firm s use an initial nm through 
their partnership process as an opportunity fo r th e would be partner to gain wider exposure within the 
firm and to a llow the decision making committee to see them in action without hav in g to make a once 
and fo r a ll decision at the first time of asking. 
148 Their chance of making partner w ill large ly be determined by the co mbination of their own 
attributes as a lawyer and the business case for making them a partner. 
149 An anathema to the notion of th e low level o fwo rker monitoring found within the tournament 
mode l. 
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• loss of credibilit y for the department/partners which may prejudice their chances 
of securing future partnership promotions for their departments; and 
• the negative impact such a result would have on the associate in question and 
other associates within the group with partnership aspirations, would lead to a 
risk that these individuals would leave and the department/partners lose valuable 
members 0 f their team. 
Even where such individuals do exist, they are unlikely to publicise the fact that they 
have failed to make partner due to the negative consequences this may have in their 
ability to secure another position. 150 
A further issue to be considered is whether or not I should confme data gathering to 
"equity" partners only, "fixed share" partners only or whether to include both in the 
exercise?151 I concluded, for three reasons, that confming the research to one group 
or the other was urmecessary. Firstly, tournament theory suggests that the structure 
works where the prize for wirming is sufficiently greater than the reward for not 
wirming. This is likely to be the case whether the type of partnership on offer is 
"equity" or "fIxed share". Secondly, the true value of achieving partnership in any 
given fIrm is very difficult to ascertain and gaining an "equity" partnership in one 
fIrm may well be a lesser prize than achieving a " fIxed share" elsewhere. Thirdly, to 
date, the literature published on tournament theory and its application to law fIrms 
has made no such distinction. 
Existing partners then, regardless ofwhether equity or fIxed share, appear to form 
the best potential source of the data sought. Having reached this conclusion, in order 
to ensure that the data generated is both as reliable as possible and relatively up to 
date, a further refInement of the potential data source is necessary, that is, to confme 
the research to partners promoted in 2000 and later. This survey group, in my view, 
provides a sufficient number of potential subjects on which to base the research and 
their reflections on the promotion to partnership process will be relatively reliable as 
the events in question happened in the recent past. 
However, the selection of such a survey group is not without its own major issues -
most signifIcantly that the survey group comprises individuals who are notoriously 
short of time for anything but their professional duties. 152 Partners made up since 
150 Gil son and Mnookin ( 1989) , op. cit. , n. 14, p . 567 "If the associate tr ies to leave her current firm 
afte r not being p romoted to partner, any o ther potential employer receives an obv ious signa l about the 
assoc iate's abilities . The firm with the best knowledge concerning the assoc iate's abilities declined to 
make her a partner." p . 577. 
151Equity partners are those who own part of the business and rece ive a "share" of the profits of the 
business, they are true "partners" under English law. "Fixed share" , sometimes referred to as 
"sa lar ied partners", have the title "Partner" but, rece ive a fi xed ruTIOlmt of remuneration which is 
usually independent of the financia l performance of the firm . 
152 An indication of th e time paucit y o f junior partners was revea led in the response of one HR 
Director to an enquiry as to the possibility ofconducting the Case Stud y interviews at the ir firm, they 
commented , "see if you can't limit it [the in terviews] to 30 minutes". 
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2000 are those most likely to be under pressure to perform and prove themselves in 
their role as junior partners. 
If fIxed equity they may well have one eye on (and may already be competing in) the 
next round of the tournament, promotion to equity partner. If already an equity 
partner they may feel under pressure to justify their new level of remuneration. 153 In 
all cases they will have taken on the greater responsibilities and powers of being a 
partner together with the stresses and strains that imposes. Typically, though they 
will now have a slightly lower target for chargeable hours, they will acquire 
managerial and business generation responsibilities that far outweigh this modest 
allowance. On top of these professional pressures many junior partners will have 
competing interests from their families . 
My second concern relates to being able to provide those taking part in the research 
with suffIcient comfort regarding the confidentiality of their data and the non-
attributable nature of the reporting of their data. These are , naturally, major concerns 
for those who would be volunteering potentially sensitive information about 
themselves and their firms in circumstances where they are reliant on that institution 
for their livelihood. My approach and methodology would, therefore, need to 
convince them that the data they provided would be treated in a confidential manner 
and reporting of the data would not lead to them or their firms being identifIable in 
any way. In short, the subjects of the research would need to trust me. 
Taken together, my concerns meant that it would be potentially diffIcult to convince 
members of the survey group of the benefits of participating in my research study. I 
would need to find some form of leverage to overcome resistance to them taking part 
and all these factors would necessarily influence my choice of research method. 
The Means 
Moving on to the question of by what means I could generate relevant data from the 
chosen sources, there are further matters to consider. Two field research methods 
were potentially suitable for the qualitative data generation referred to above : 
• interviews with individual partners ; and/or 
• a questionnaire issued to individual partners. 
My preferred method of generating a rich set of qualitative data was face-to-face 
interviews. However, fmancial and time constraints meant that this was not 
practicable. However, interviews by telephone were a real poss ibility. The major 
downside of any sort of interview is that they are time consuming for the 
153 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit., n. 3, p. 122, and recent publicity surrounding the de-equ it isation of 
partners in large U K law firms, Husnara Begum , The Lawyer (23 October 2006) 
http ://www.thc lawycr.com/cg i-binJitcll1.cgi·)id= 12255 1 &d= II &h=24&f-=23 and Helen Power and 
Emma Vere-lones, Th e Lawyer (24 March 2003) http ://www .the lawyer.coll1/cgi-
binlitcll1 .cgi? id =82 14 1&d= ll & h=24&f-=23 . 
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interviewees and, given the time pressures on junior partners outlined above, there 
was limited potential for sourcing and speaking to a large enough number of willing 
lawyers in the time available for the completion of this research project. Without 
face-to-face contact the issue of trust regarding confidentiality and attribution was 
also likely to remain a live one. 
Gathering data via a questionnaire is attractive, in that it would open up a potentially 
wider subject group. It is also an inexpensive and time efficient way to gather data. 
The major drawback of using a questionnaire when seeking qualitative data is that 
there is no control over the quality and relevance of the responses. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that, without prior research effort to test the efficacy of the 
questions posed, the questions themselves may not be effective. In addition, a "cold 
call" survey does nothing to address the issues relating to confidentiality/ attribution 
and the number of responses likely to be achieve from such a survey is likely to be 
I 154 ow. 
After considering the factors outlined above I decided to adopt the following field 
research methodology: 
I . Conduct a pilot case study via telephone interviews with a limited number of 
partners, in this case six, from a single firm - the "Case Study". 
2. Issue a questionnaire to a wider number of partners from within the chosen 
survey group (the "Questionnaire") based on the questions used in the Case 
Study and amended to take into account the knowledge and data derived from 
the Case Study. 
The Case Study 
I decided that the interviews would be semi-structured and of approximately one 
hour in duration. The aim was that they should provide high quality data relevant to 
the Research Question and the subsidiary matters outlined above. They would also, I 
hoped, shed light on the type of question and lines of enquiry that could best be 
utilised in the Questionnaire. 
To overcome issues relating to the time paucity of the partners to be interviewed for 
the Case Study and trust regarding confidentiality/attribution the sample would be 
generated via an e-mail request to a number ofHR Directors of major UK Law firms 
that were known to me. They would be asked if they would contact partners at their 
154 See D.A. Asch, M .K. Jedrziewski and N.A . Chri stakis, ' Response Rates to Mail Surveys 
Publi shed in Medical Journals' ( 1997) 50 Journal o/Clinical Ep idemiology 11 29 for an examination 
ofrelative ly low response rates common in surveys of busy profess ions. See a lso Penny Brooker, 
'Co nstruction Lawye rs' Attitudes and Experience with ADR' (2002) Construction Law Journal 18(2), 
97 -11 6 for an example of the response rate (just above 24%) for a survey of so licitors; and M. Gill 
and J. Hart, ' Private Security: Enfo rc ing Corporate Securi ty Policy Us ing Private Inves tigators' 
( 1999) 7 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Res earch 245 where a posta l questionnaire 
di stributed to 1,500 so licitors yie lded a response rate of 6.4%. 
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firm from the survey group with a view to them taking part in the interviews. The 
assistance of the HR Directors would: 
• lend credibility to the research study in the eyes of the partners; 
• endorse the credentials of the researcher; and 
• lend weight to the promises relating to confidentiality and non-attribution of data 
made in the research materials. 
I hoped these factors would, cumulatively, increase the chances of partners being 
willing to give up their time to be interviewed. 
In the event, two law firm HR Directors offered to assist me by approaching relevant 
partners at their firms with a view to them taking part in the Case Study. I made the 
choice between the two firms on the basis of the availability of the HR Director to 
assist and their enthusiasm for the project. All partners within the survey group were 
e-mailed by the HR Director and I interviewed six of the eight partners who stated 
that they were willing to take part in the case study. 
The Questionnaire 
After analysing the data derived from the interviews I was able to draft the 
Questionnaire for distribution to a wider survey group. In seeking to make the final 
Questionnaire as unambiguous as possible I edited the questions in the light of my 
experience with the Case Study interviews. In the event, no substantive changes 
were needed. A sma ll number of questions were omitted; the wording of some 
questions was slightly amended to meet the revised format; and the order in which 
the questions appear on the Questionnaire was altered when compared to the 
document used to structure the interviews. 
To overcome issues relating to time paucity ofpartners and trust issues regarding 
confidentiality and non-attribution, I decided to approach a number of former 
col leagues and other contacts working as partners and HR Directors in large UK 
based law firms with a view to them completing the Questionnaire themselves 
(provided they were within the survey group) and then forwarding the Questionnaire 
to individuals they knew who were also in the survey group. The Questionnaires 
would then be returned to me directly by the individual members oftbis "snowball" 
sample . 
This means of establishing a survey group can introduce bias into a study due to the 
fact that the sample is not representative of the whole of the constituency but rather 
the survey group tends to be a discrete grouping or network within that entire 
constituency. However, the lack of an appropriate and effective alternative method 
of gathering relevant data that would overcome the difficulties outlined above and 
allow the generation ofa sufficiently large sample mean that it was necessary to take 
sLlch a ri sk. 
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A young associate was invited to a party at the home of an august senior 
partner at his ftrm. The associate wandered awestruck through the house, 
especially amazed at the original artworks by Picasso, Matisse and others 
adorning the walls. As the associate stood gazing at one Picasso, the senior 
partner approached, and put his arm around the associate's shoulder. "Yes," 
he said, "if you work long and hard, day in and day out, six, seven days a 
week, ten, twelve hours a day ... I could buy another one! 
Marc Galanter l55 
Part IVA 
The Case Study - Analysis of Case Study Data - Testing the Theoretical 
Framework 
The Questions Used to Test the Theoretical Framework 
Having performed the fteld research in the manner described in Part III, I then 
analysed the data in accordance with the theoretical framework established in the 
conclusion to Part II. More speciftcally, I used the questions set out in the conclusion 
to Part II to test the theoretical framework. In order to provide a more effective 
structure within which to report and analyse the data, I made minor adjustments to 
the questions, details of which I set out below. 
Firstly, I amended the question: 
If promotion percentage and continued hiring of junior lawyers are not the 
whole of the story, how do associates weigh up their chances of becoming a 
partner? 
so that it was split into two separate questions, the ftrst being: 
Do associates, when weighing up their chances of becoming a partner, take 
into account the partner promotion percentage and/or continued hiring of 
junior lawyers? 
and the second being: 
155 Marc Ga lanter, ' Tournament of l okes: Generational Tension in Large Law Firms' (2006) 84 North 
Carolina Law Rev. 169 1. 
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How do associates weigh up their chances of becoming a partner? 
I decided that it would be more useful to use this second question later on in the 
analysis rather than in its original position as set out in the conclusion to Part II. 
I also chose to include, as part of my analysis the fmal quotation from Galanter and 
Palay in the conclusion to Part II and to pose it in the form of a question, that is: 
[do associates] have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules of the 
game and a reasonably accurate perception of the partners' desires?1 56 
I found, through conducting the analysis, that a further question needed to be 
addressed in was to fully test the theoretical framework I had developed, namely: 
What implied promise/deal 157 do the associates monitor? 
Consequently, with a view to answering the Research Question, the questions I used 
to interrogate the Case Study data were as follows: 
I. Unanswered Questions - Does the research data provide us with a better idea of: 
a. when the tournament becomes the prime motivating factor for associates? 
b. who are the "entering class" for the purposes of monitoring the 
partnership promotion rate? 
c. do associates, when weighing up their chances of becoming a partner, 
take into account the partner promotion percentage and/or continued 
hiring of junior lawyers? 
2. Propositions in need offurther testing - Does the research data provide any 
evidence of 
a. the "seeding" and/or "tracking" of associates? 
b. a distinction between "paper work" and "training work" and the 
importance of the latter in the promotion to partner process? 
c. the role played by multiple incentives, alongside the tournament, in 
motivating associates? 
3. Areas of Broad Consensus - Does the research data support or negate the 
propositions that: 
a. the tournament exists for senior associates? 
b. the partnership promotion process is opaque? 
4. Ho w do associates weigh up their chances of becoming a partner? 
156 Galanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27, p. 1688. 
157 In this context, the terms "promise", "deal" , "transaction" and "contrac t" are used interchangeab ly 
by the various writers on this subject. I wi ll attempt to confine myself to the use of " promise", 
"ba rgain" or "deal" in the remainder of this work. Whatever term is used to denote the "bargain" 
between associates and their firms , it is always an implied promise and never an express one. 
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5. What promise are the associates monitoring? 
6. Do associates have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules and 
partners ' desires? 
Questions 1,2 and 3 involve the straightforward analysis of the Case Study data in 
order to discover whether or not it sheds light on the matters in hand. Questions 4 
and 5 seek to unpack what implied promise the interviewees are monitoring during 
the pre-partner period. In order to work out which implied promise they are 
monitoring it is first necessary to consider what the associates actually monitor and 
specifically whether or not the "fixed percentage of entering class" statistic is of 
importance to them, as is envisaged in the Research Question. In Galanter and 
Palay's view the readily observable "fixed percentage" is a key factor in giving 
associates quantifiable reassurance about their chances of becoming a partner. 158 
Describing the Data 
As indicated above I have sought to use the theoretical framework established in 
Part II to structure my description and analysis of the Case Study data. For ease of 
reading and reference I have included my "Preliminary Comments" after considering 
each question. In addition, I have attempted, wherever possible and appropriate, to 
let the individuals interviewed for the Case Study (the "Interviewees") speak for 
themselves. Where they make a good point or illustrate some issue particularly well, 
I rely on their comments rather than describing what they have said. 
Why is the Research Question important? 
Before dealing with the Case Study data itself, I feel it is important to re-emphasise 
why the Research Question is significant when it comes to analysing the application 
of tournament theory to law firms. According to tournament theory, the implied 
promise is that each associate has a chance, in defined circumstances, of making 
partner at their firm. 159 It is this implied deal that provides the motivational force 
underpinning the organisational structure firms use to mitigate the agency costs 
associated with paying their workers on a basis other than productivity. In short, it 
allows large law firms to operate in the way they do . 
158 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 34, p. 960. 
159 Ga lanter and Palay, op . c it. , n. 3, p. 100 , that is, the flfm will make up a fixed percentage of the 
assoc iate's entering c lass. 
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Testing the Theoretical Framework 
1. Unanswered Questions 
These questions address core issues raised by the Research Question. I first consider 
the matters that may be revealed by addressing each question and then move on to 
examining what the research data actually reveals. 
Question 1 (a) - when does the tournament become the prime motivating factor for 
associates? Those associates who are motivated by the prospect of making partner 
will be the group that are concerned with monitoring the implied promise. This 
question seeks to identify at what level of post qualification experience (''PQE'') 
they start to be concerned with such issues. Logically, unless and until an associate 
is motivated by the chance of becoming a partner they should be disinterested in any 
implied promise relating to partnership potentialities. 
Question 1 (b) - who are the "entering class "for the purposes of monitoring the 
partnership promotion rate? This question should address whether or not those 
monitoring the implied promise actually use such a ratio as a marker of their chances 
of making partner. It is worthwhile recalling that it is the perceptions of those 
involved in the promotion to partner process that are crucial to establishing whether 
or not the rules of the tournament, as they relate to the monitoring of the implied 
promise, hold true. 160 
Question 1 (c) - do associates, when weighing up their chances of becoming a 
partner, take into account the partner promotion percentage and/or continued hiring 
of junior lawyers? This question covers similar ground to Question l(b) above. In 
addition, it should indicate whether or not associates do derive comfort from the 
factors described by Galanter and Palay as providing them with reassurance that the 
firm will continue to meet its implied promise. 161 
Question 1 (a) - when does the tournament become the prime motivating factor for 
associates? - Analysis 
The Case Study interviews revealed that a distinction could usefully be made 
between the period when becoming a partner starts to be a motivating factor for the 
associate and the period during which it is the prime motivating factor for that 
associate. For four of the six Interviewees partnership was a motivating factor from 
very early on in their careers. Three said it was a motivation from day one of their 
careers and the fourth from very soon thereafter. 162 The remaining two Interviewees 
160 Promiseslbargains are only capab le of providing motivation if their outcome is monitored and 
ca red about by the recipient. An unmonitored and uncared for promise has no motivational va lue. 
16 1 Galanter and Palay, op . cit., n. 3 , pp . 10 I- I 02. 
162 Interestingly this percentage reflects the findings of the Legal Business survey of law firm 
assoc iates (Doggett, op . cit. , n. 64) wh ich included questions on their attitudes toward ach ieving 
partnership . As noted at page I I of th is work, of 2 , 186 Respondents, just under two thirds were 
attracted by the idea of being a partner. Being attracted by the idea of partnership is clearly not the 
- 35 -
found promotion to partner to be their prime motivation at more or less the same 
time that it became a motivating factor at all. For them this was after five and a half 
years and seven years PQE. 
Overall, the data on when promotion to partner became the individual's prime 
motivation did not reveal any particular pattern. The commencement of that period 
varied from two years PQE up to seven years PQE with the time gap between the 
start of that period and when the individual made partner varying from one and a 
half years, in two cases, to up to five years in another. 
Preliminary Comments 
Data from the Case Study interviews suggests that the relevant group for monitoring 
the implied promise comprises associates (and even possibly trainees) from very 
early in their careers and not just senior associates. It is also clear that once 
promotion to partner becomes their prime motivation the importance of the implied 
promise being kept and their ability to monitor the firm' s commitment to it becomes 
ever more important. 
Question 1 (b) - who are the "entering class" for the purposes of monitoring the 
partnership promotion rate? - Analysis 
There was no evidence derived from the Case Study interviews to suggest that 
Interviewees took any interest in the percentage of the "entering class" that was 
made up to partner each year. One Interviewee felt that they were in direct 
competition for partnership slots with those in their own "entering class" while five 
Interviewees felt there was never any direct or "head to head" competition. One 
Interviewee summed up the situation by saying that, to the extent that there was 
competition: 
it's not like running a race where you are in the same stadium 
Preliminary Comments 
For this sample, monitoring based on promotion percentage of "entering class" 
either did not take place or was regarded as insignificant as a marker of the firm 
meeting the implied promise. This finding is based on the lack ofa perception of 
competition between peers and no evidence of any form of calculation of promotion 
percentage based on "entering class" numbers. 163 
same as being motivated to achieve that status, however, it is interesting to note that many young 
lawyers co ntinue to be attracted by the thought, at least, of making partner. 
163 Even though the stati stics a llowing this calcul ation to be performed with relative ease are readily 
ava ilable. 
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Question 1 (c) - do associates, when weighing up their chances of becoming a 
partner, take into account the partner promotion percentage and/or continued 
hiring of junior lawyers? - Analysis 
Partner Promotion Percentage - Though the promotion percentage of "entering 
class" seems to be of little importance to the Interviewees, they saw the absolute 
level of promotions to partnership as extremely significant when it came to working 
out their chances of making partner and in consequence being able to monitor the 
ftrm's promise. Again, no detailed analysis of relative promotion rates was revealed 
by the data. A typical statement was: 
I observed a steady promotion of partners. Never large numbers, but usually 
there were very few people that I was aware of had been through the process 
and not got it. 
At this firm, continued commitment to partner promotion, where a sound business 
case could be made for that promotion, was taken as a given, though there was a 
defmite perception among the Interviewees that making it to partner had become 
tougher. There were two specific comments along the lines of this one: 
I was just aware that people were saying it was getting harder to make 
partner and the rates [of partner promotion] weren't as big. I mean there 
were times that it was up in the high teens [each year], now in the last couple 
of years it's been sort of twelve ish, that sort of figure. 
The following comment illustrates how important this continued commitment to 
making up partners was to the Interviewees: 
[the partner promotion rate] was good. Therefore, I didn ' t feel there was a 
block. But had I been at a firm where there had been announcements that 
we're not making up any more partners I'm sure I would have felt differently 
Continued hiring of junior lawyers - The continued hiring of junior lawyers (and 
especially trainees) was seen as significant by five of the Interviewees in terms of 
giving an indication of their firm's long term confidence in its business via the 
commitment to growing the business and providing the necessary levels of staffing 
and future partnerial talent to do so. However, it was regarded as a less important 
marker of the firm 's commitment to keeping the implied promise than the continued 
promotion of partners. Two Interviewees stated outright that it had no impact on 
their perception of their chances of making partner and a further Interviewee 
intimated the same. One Interviewee commented that the continued hiring of junior 
lawyers: 
Looks to the longer term survival and prosperity of the firm and that is only 
sustainable through continually getting the very best people in so that they 
can keep that tradition going. 
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Another stated that it was: 
just part and parcel of overall feeling of confidence about the [firm] 
Preliminary Comments 
At this firm both the partner promotion rate and continued hiring of junior lawyers 
were perceived as auguring well for the firm's continued commitment to making up 
partners in the future and to growing the business further. This was the case 
notwithstanding the fact that the Interviewees attached a more uniformly and 
specific level of importance to the number of partners promoted year on year than 
they attached to the continued hiring of junior lawyers. The monitoring of both 
phenomena was, however, far from sophisticated and concerned with bald numbers 
per annum rather than any more qualitative measures. 
2. Propositions in Need of Further Testing 
Interrogating the research data through the use of these questions might reveal 
further elements of professional life that the Interviewees considered important 
factors in their career progression and in influencing their chances of making 
partner. Though the Research Question does not demand direct investigation of these 
questions, as noted in Section III, what the research data may reveal about them may 
influence our appreciation of the context in which the Research Question is set. In 
itself, this might have a bearing on the findings relating to the Research Question. 
As per the analysis of Question 1 above, I first consider what matters may be 
revealed by addressing each question and I then move on to examining what the 
research data actually reveals. 
Question 2(a) - does the research data provide any evidence of the "seeding" 
and/or "tracking " of associates? No questions specific to these matters were asked 
of the Interviewees. However, given the nature of the areas being covered, it was 
likely that data relevant to these questions would be revealed and that the questions 
themselves would be a useful means by which to interrogate that data. The 
importance of analysis along these lines is that the data may indicate whether 
"seeded" or "tracked" individuals were at any advantage regarding the monitoring of 
the implied promise and their own chances of making partner. 
Question 2(b) - does the research data provide any evidence of a distinction 
between "paper work" and "training work " and the importance of the lalter in the 
promotion to partner process? Questions here were aimed at discovering how 
important the Interviewees perceived their history of work assignments to be in 
providing information on their chances of becoming a partner. 
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Question 2(c) - does the research data provide any evidence of the role played by 
multiple incentives, alongside the tournament, in motivating associates? These 
questions should reveal whether and to what extent forces other than the opportunity 
for promotion to partner were at play in influencing the Interviewees performance 
and any interplay between the various incentives. 
Question 2(a) - does the research data provide any evidence of the "seeding" 
and/or "tracking" of associates? - Analysis 
Seeding - No data was obtained relevant to the phenomenon of "seeding". 
Tracking - It was evident that two Interviewees had experienced strong, though 
informal, mentor relationships, which provided guidance and support through the 
partner promotion process and earlier on in each individual's career. One of these 
individuals provided conclusive evidence during their interview that "tracking" had 
taken place during their career: 
X: .. . anyway, he [the mentor partner] played an important role in 
making sure I stayed here and that I should view myself as having a long-
term fiJture here. 
DS : And to what extent was he instrumental in you getting on to those 
deals [that you saw as crucial to your career progression]? 
X: Very much so. 
A further Interviewee seemed to have experienced a "tracking" style of career 
development: 
From very early on I was given very testing assignments and was assumed 
[by the partners] as being one of those able associates 
However, for the majority of the Interviewees it was only during the formal partner 
promotion process (the "PPP") that they perceived that the partners in their group 
were starting to assist them in furthering their careers, that is, by supporting them in 
their bid to become a partner. 
Preliminary Comments 
No conclusion can be drawn from the absence of data on "seeding" as no specific 
questions were asked on this area . Evidence of "tracking" was revealed by the data, 
for two Interviewees at least , but no pattern of experiences emerged as to indicate 
whether or not "tracking" was an essential element in making partner or in providing 
greater insight as to the firm ' s commitment to meeting the implied promise or to an 
individual's chances of making partner. Inferences regarding the prevalence of 
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"tracking" behaviour might be justified after considering the data relevant to the next 
question on the distinction between "paper work' and "training work" and how such 
work comes to be allocated. However, the only explicit evidence of "tracking" was 
that set out above. 
Question 2(b) - does the research data provide any evidence of a distinction 
between ''paper work" and Ittraining work" and the importance of the latter in the 
promotion to partner process? - Analysis 
All Interviewees stressed that the diet of work assignments they undertook was a key 
factor in how they viewed their chances of making partner. Two, of the many, 
comments on this issue provide particularly good summaries of the Interviewees' 
opinions. One Interviewee stated that they were receiving: 
increasingly important roles on increasingly premium deals of the firm. So, 
that confirmed that I was still viewed positively 
and the second Interviewee commented that: 
[the work being carried out] was driving the assumption that I would be put 
up for the partnership process, The quality of work which I was doing which 
was placing me in that position, I think. 
In terms of showing progression towards partner, the data reveals that the 
Interviewees perceived that work assignments that provided them with increasing 
levels of responsibility and which they were left to manage by themselves were of 
the greatest significance. As well as providing an indication of how well regarded 
they were, four Interviewees specifically mentioned the fact that doing "quasi 
partner" work had given them the confidence that they had the abilities needed to be 
a partner. The fo llowing two quotations illustrate this point. 
and 
And that whole exercise, [a particular work assignment] which turned out 
successfully and well for the client, was - I felt - a result where I could see 
that leaving aside what anyone said , I could see that my work ... had direct 
input into us successfully defending a case .. .. I could recognise myself that I 
had an ability to do things which ... could contribute and make a difference 
in that environment. So, I was certainly fit to belong there [the partnership] 
even if there were things to work on. I had at least some of the skills that 
were appropriate. 
the first year [put up for partnership] I wasn't ... particularly confident. By 
the second year, and having done my secondment and because 1 was getting 
my own work, and effectively was ... de facto carrying out the role ofa 
partner. I was much more confident about it [making partner]. 
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All the Interviewees contributed comments that reinforced the perception that during 
their period as an associate they realised their performance during their work 
assignments had established that they were able to do the work of a partner. Having 
established to themselves and the partners in their group that they had the necessary 
partner credentials they entered a period where they needed simply to keep on doing 
what they had been doing. 
There wasn't anything different expected of me .... Ijust kept on doing my 
job. 
During this period there was evidently a strong feeling of the need to avoid making 
significant mistakes or errors of judgment that might detract from the favourable 
perception of their abilities that the partners had formed. 
I suppose the only thing that I thought of was that I had to keep my nose 
clean. 
Another Interviewee commented that: 
If you do one piece of bad work, then there ' s no two ways about it , that will 
come up. So, it was making sure that I never ..... got a bogey hole. And that 
was achievable. 
The most blunt summation of this scenario is encapsulated in a comment made by 
one Interviewee who, having proved themselves to have partner level abilities in the 
execution of their assignments and with a "complete business case" behind them felt 
that they then entered a period when: 
It was really down to me to fuck it up. 
Preliminary Comments 
The importance attached by the Interviewees to the type of work assignments they 
were undertaking was one of the most striking features of the interviews. It is clear 
that this was a source of information that aU the Interviewees saw as providing a 
clear indication of how their progress toward making partner was proceeding. The 
work they undertook enabled them to demonstrate their partner credentials. No 
specific references to or, comparisons with, "paper work" type assignments were 
evident. Although the Interviewees' inherent concern with the quality of their work 
assignments suggests that ambitious associates did not seek out " paper work" type 
assignments. 
The feeling that pa11ner credentials had been established by the time the partnership 
promotion process got underway is significant when analysing the structure and 
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timing of the tournament l64 . In addition, the importance of the way in which work 
assignments are allocated might allow some inferences to be drawn regarding how 
the "tracking" of associates takes place , though it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to do so . 
Question 2(c) - does the research data provide any evidence of the role played by 
multiple incentives, alongside the tournament, in motivating associates?-
Analysis 
High Wages - None of the Interviewees regarded high wages as a motivating factor 
in itself Two Interviewees made the point that if money was a main motivating 
factor, other careers in the City of London were potentially more lucrative. 
Examples cited were investment banking and management consulting. Four 
Interviewees stated that a key factor for them in selecting the law as a career was the 
combination of good pay and relatively good job security. The following comments 
were typical : 
and 
But the promise of a decent living, the promise of a more secure professional 
living than being a banker or something along those lines, I think that is quite 
important actually. 
But I think fundamentally that ' s what's drawn me to a profession. I'm very 
security minded and I expect with a lot of the people you interview, we're 
prepared to pay a lot, or forsake a lot, for that security. 
One Interviewee mentioned that the importance of pay was in the level of pay 
received relative to peers at the same firm. Being at the top of a pay band gave an 
indication of being seen as "on track" as regards partnership. 
[T]he level of pay at least internally within banding was important in as 
much as it set down a marker as to how I was perceived 
Preliminary Comments 
Given the high degree of motivation to become partners within the Interviewee 
sample it is not surprising, perhaps, that high pay was not of itself a motivating 
factor. 165 
164 The Interv iewees perce ived th at the ir onl y opportunity from this point on was to detract fro m their 
reputation for high quali ty performance . 
16 Allen & Overy's recentl y announced new career/wage structure for associates is a tac it admiss ion 
of the importance ofremuneration as a mo tivationa l incentive for those who may not want to be 
partners or, where the prospect of partnersh ip has become too remote to be an ince ntive to promote 
exceptiona l effort, see H usnara Begum, and Vanessa Arora, The Lawyer (23 October 2006) 
http ://www.thc lawycLcom/cgi-b in/ itcm.cg i?id= I22602&d= II &h=24&f'=23 ). See also Wilkins and 
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Firm's Reputation 
Three Interviewees regarded their flfm ' s reputation as especially important when 
they were choosing a flfm at which to train. As an ongoing factor four Interviewees 
said they wanted to be working with a firm perceived to be a market leader. Relevant 
cormnents were that moving elsewhere would be "taking a step down in calibre" and 
one partner, using a sporting metaphor, wanted to be working in a firm that was 
"competing for the championship". 
Two Interviewees referred specifically to the perception that their flfm's reputation 
would provide a good signal of their abilities in the external job market, should they 
ever leave, with one Interviewee cormnenting: 
I can benchmark my achievements in a tangible way and if, ultimately, I 
move elsewhere and decide to do something else well I have achieved a 
standard which is recognisable to an external cormnunity. 
Preliminary Comments 
Again, given the high degree of motivation to become partners within the 
Interviewee sample it is, perhaps, not surprising that the reputational benefits in the 
external employment market gained by working at a prestigious law firm would not 
be overly motivational for them. If their view is that they are going to make partner 
at this firm then the signals that their firm ' s reputation sends to the external 
employment market about their abilities are largely irrelevant. 
General Legal Training - The availability of general legal training was largely taken 
as a given by the Interviewees. One Interviewee stated that they were motivated to 
stay with the flfm due to the training they were receiving but this related to a specific 
qualification that the firm was supporting them through rather than general legal 
training available to all. Of the other Interviewees three considered the availability 
of general legal training an important factor for the two year period of their training 
contract and two Interviewees specifically referred to finding learning on the job 
from practitioners who were the best in their field especially beneficial. 
Preliminary Comments 
A vailabil ity of general legal training was seen as part of the package that the 
Interviewees signed up to on joining their firm and , for them, was clearly not a 
motivating factor. They expected such training to be available at all large law firms. 
Opportunity for promotion to partner - The data relevant to this question is already 
set out under Question I above . It is sufficient to repeat here that the opportunity for 
G ulati , op. c it. , n. 3, p. 1635 "The less credible a firm' s partnership promises, the more it is likely to 
re lyo n high wages or promises o f providing valuable external signals." 
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promotion to partner was the strongest motivational factor for these Interviewees by 
a significant margin. 
Preliminary Comments 
The Case Study data clearly indicates that being in with a chance of promotion to 
partner was, for these individuals, the most important motivational factor in their 
careers. There was no evidence of any interplay between this and the other 
incentives covered though some were considered to be of relevance during defined 
periods. For example, the firm's reputation and availability of general legal training 
being of material importance when selecting a firm to train at and during the two 
year training contract period respectively. 
Only the opportunity for promotion to partner was regarded by all the Interviewees 
as a significant motivating factor and, for four of them, this was from very early on 
in their careers. 
3. Does the research data support or negate the propositions that: 
a. the tournament exists for senior associates? and 
h. the partnership promotion process is opaque? 
As noted in the conclusion to Part II, the research data could be expected to reinforce 
the aspects ofthe application oftoumament theory to law firms that already appear 
well settled. No specific questions on these matters were asked during the Case 
Study interviews, however, given the areas covered during those interviews I would 
expect much of the data generated to be of relevance to these questions. 
Analysis based on these questions addresses specific issued raised by the Research 
Question and should also provide information on the wider contextual framework 
within which the Research Question is set. As per the analysis of Questions 1 and 2 
above, I first consider what matters may be revealed by addressing each question 
and then move on to examining what the research data actually reveals. 
Question 3 (a) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
tournament exists/or senior associates? This question seeks to identify which 
individuals are taking part in the tournament with specific attention paid to senior 
associates. As with Question l(a) above the data may provide useful information 
about just who are the relevant constituencies for the purposes of monitoring the 
implied promise. 
Question 3 (b) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
partnership promotion process is opaque? The degree to which the data supports or 
negates the view that the promotion to partnership process is opaque has direct 
relevance to whether or not the associates are able to build up a picture of the 
promotion process sufficient to contribute to their reasonably accurate understanding 
of the "rules" and the "partners' desires". 
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Question 3(a) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
tournament exists for senior associates?- Analysis 
The data reveals that partnership was a motivation for the majority ofInterviewees 
from very early in their careers and that this motivation was not just limited to their 
time as senior associates. The three comments below were typical of the views 
expressed. 
[F]rom day one as a trainee and probably before that, my personal working 
assumption was that if I was there then I ought therefore, to be working 
towards partner and would therefore be doing that. 
When I was a trainee there was a still a general belief that if you were a 
trainee you were here to try and be a partner. ... I don't think that's true for 
everybody but that's kind of what I had in my mind. 
I didn't have a huge long-term plan but I suppose that's because I always 
expected or wanted to be a partner. ... I kind of always assumed that was the 
reason I'd been hired, to be part of the firm. 
Though, in the early stages of their careers, there was a certain coyness about 
admitting to having partnership ambitions. 
[H]ad I been asked as a trainee, "Do you think you' 11 be a partner?" I 
wouldn't have said, "Yes, defmitely". But I'd probably have said, "I don't 
see why not". 
A feeling expressed clearly by one of the Interviewees was that during this early 
stage they had not undertaken the type of work that would allow anyone to assess 
whether or not that had the abilities or aptitudes required of a partner. 
At my appraisal at the end of my second year - so at two years PQE, and 
much to the amusement, I learn, of those who were supervising me - I asked 
the question as to whether I was at least making early strides in the right 
direction, i.e. showing the relevant aptitude and skills. Which, of course, 
they were all no doubt all sniggering about hugely because at two years who 
knows. But it was certainly, I'd felt that that it was a bit rich to have asked 
any earlier than that. So, in terms of knowing that I was, you know, in the 
whatever, upper decile percentile that was what was required, then I wanted 
some assurance that I was at least doing what I could to do that. So, it 
[partnership] was kind of on my agenda first at about two years. 166 
All Interviewees then experienced a period during which they sought to establish 
sound partnership credentials. This period followed on from the early stages of 
166 Note the relevance ofGulati e t a i's work on this point, Gulati , e t a i, op. c it. , n. 61. 
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associateship considered above and, though exact timings differed between 
individuals, some common elements experienced by the Interviewees during this 
period emerged. Firstly, the importance attached to the type of work they were 
doing. This phenomenon has already been considered above l67, its significance was 
stressed by all Interviewees. Secondly, this period also gave the Interviewees their 
ftrst serious opportunity to weigh up their chances ofmaking partner. The point at 
which this occurred varied between individuals from one and a half to four years 
prior to making partner. The common theme regarding timing that emerges from the 
data is that this serious weighing up of chances took place once individuals felt that, 
through their work assignment experience, they had developed their partnerial skill 
sets. Thirdly, it was clear from the interviews that high levels of chargeable hours 
were worked by each Interviewee during this period. All Interviewees were content 
that their hours record had more than met any de minimis level that might be 
expected of them by their ftrm, to the extent that they did not consider hours worked 
to be an issue for them as a qualiftcation for becoming a partner. This was the case 
even though there was evidently some confusion as to what exactly was expected of 
them in terms of hours put in and notwithstanding the firm's formal target of 1700 
chargeable hours per annum for associates. 
My view on that [chargeable hours] is that you have to achieve a certain 
minimum. I don't know what that minimum is or was. But I'm sure you had 
to demonstrate that you did a certain level of chargeable work. In fact, I 
probably, what I did way exceeded that and to the detriment of doing other 
things which would have been better for me. 
Three partners remarked that it was easy to achieve high levels of billable hours 
because they had such a lot of work to do and never struggled to find it. The two 
comments below illustrate these points. 
It was very easy to be doing seven and a half [chargeable hours] a day. At 
times ... I had some real mega deals where I had to work myarse off But 
on the whole I felt it was more balanced. I could turn up at 8.30am and work 
until 7.30 pretty much straight through and you would have achieved an 
awful lot of chargeable hours 
I made sure that I checked from week to week to make sure that I was hitting 
kind of seven and a half hours a day which ... was the target for assistants, 
which works out at 1700 hours a year. I thought, well I'm never going to 
make partner if I'm not at least hitting my 1700 hours . So, I made sure that I 
did that and that wasn't actually difficult because I've got lots of work. 
It was evident from the data that the period in the immediate run-up to the 
partnership promotion decision formed a further distinct period as far as the 
Interviewees were concerned. This period commences after the individual has 
established their partner credentials and once the partners in their group have 
167 Sec page 40 of this work. 
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decided they should be put forward for the formal partnership promotion process 
(the "ppp,,).168 At this firm this period is characterised by collaboration between the 
group ' s partners and the associate bein~ put forward , so as to maximise that 
associate ' s chance of making partner. 16 It is also the time when the associate feels 
compelled to "keep their nose clean". 170 
Several instances that provided evidence of this collaborative approach were given 
by the Interviewees. I set some out below, grouped by theme. 
1. Specific preparation for PPP 
And then there were discussions, of course, with my sponsoring partner and 
other partners in the group about the process. Because I mean some of them 
had sat on the relevant committee and, therefore, they had insights into things 
I could usefully do . And so , it was a fairly collaborative process but it was 
once I had been told in the summer . . . "We ' re putting you forward for 
promotion in April " . So, that nine months had been fairly open dialogue. 
In retrospect, at the time I was sort of confused about exactly what was 
expected of me. But I'm actually very well prepped. And then a further 
partner who was in my group who I'd worked for quite a lot spent a lot of 
time talking me though the kind of things I could be asked. And not giving 
me answers, but just saying, "These are the things you should think about" . 
So, I was amazingly well prepared. 
2. Expressions of support - formal and informal 
The people I immediately work for were basically lining me up. And overtly 
lining me up . .. 
[T]he feedback [from partners] became more focused and more informal in 
the sense of not sending out the appraisal forms but more about .. . noting 
strengths and weaknesses. 
3. Pointers on areas where performance could be improved 
It [training] was partly targeted at the area which was highlighted to me [for 
improvement] which was projecting myself more. Coming in for more 
168 In the vernacular applied at this firm once the ir "names were on the s late". 
169 Though it is o ften the case that an associate may not be promoted at their first attempt. At so me 
firms, it may even be part o f a group ' s strategy to put an assoc iate through the PPP with a v iew to 
being made up the following year if they fee l that that associate needs to have their profile increased 
via ex posurc to the partner promotions committee. 
170 Co nsidered further above at page 4 1 of this work. 
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presentations and so on . . . the training was made available to me and then I 
probably tailored it to what I wanted it for. 
4. Explicit attempts to give associate exposure to wider number ofpartners with 
and outside own group 
Part of the planning [was] that I worked for more than my historic 
relationship partners . I worked with other people as well .. . That was for my 
benefit and for their benefits, so more than one or two partners actually had a 
look at me. 
[W]hat I think was done for me was to give me opportunities to work with 
people outside my immediate structural group 
5. Development of sound business case by group in support of associate 
[Y]ou have to be put forward by your own practice area. You have to have a 
business case for the promotion of X number of partners in that practice area 
has got to be made out. And then it's about assessment of the candidate. 
[O]ur economics are stand and fall with the division's economics in terms of 
the micro-business case that says, can this group of six partners and however 
many associates sustain seven or eight partners and what will the 
consequence be? That was clearly important and this firm makes no bones 
about that. If the business case doesn't work you don ' t even get to find out 
whether you were up to it at a personal level. 
[T]hey [other law ftrms] have got very good people who are being held up 
just because of the lack of business case or whatever, I mean I had a 
complete business case behind me 
Preliminary Comments 
The widely held view that the tournament, insofar as it exists, is largely confined to 
senior associates does not seem to be borne out by the data gathered during the Case 
Study interviews. At this firm and for these individuals, partnership was a 
motivational force existing at all level of seniority and underpinned the working 
practices of these individuals long before they reached senior associate level. For 
these individuals, performance during the three stages of the process was influenced 
by the chance of making partner. These periods and the influence of the implied 
promise might be summarised as: 
• Early years - establish ski lls as good lawyer with view to receiving and 
completing "training work" assignments; 
• Middle period - establish personal partner credentials by performing 
increasingly responsible "training work" roles 
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• PPP period - establish, in combination with practice group, that they have 
sufficient combined human capital to support a further partner without 
diminishing the returns of existing partners. 
It is interesting to note how the dynamic of the overall promotion to partner process 
changes over time. It seems clear that, at this firm, the process is not governed by a 
static set of "rules" that apply throughout. However, the end result of the process is 
consistent with Gallant and Palay's proposition that it is those with the greatest 
combination of "high quality legal work and their own human capital,,)7) that will be 
promoted to partner. This is subject to a significant rider, however, as the Case 
Study data implies that it is the human capital of the individual in combination with 
that of their group which this firm is interested in when considering who should be 
promoted and not solely the human capital of the individual. The significance of the 
business case, made on behalf of the would-be partner, is that it should show that 
there is a sufficient level of human capital to support the promotion without 
diminishing the returns to existing partners. 
Question 3(b) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
partnership promotion process is opaque?- Analysis 
From the data provided by the Interviewees it seems that the promotion to 
partnership process, in its broad sense, commences only once associates have started 
to establish their partnership credentials via the work assignments that they 
undertake. During this "middle" period of their career as associates the requirements 
for attaining partnership, or even progression along the partnership track were 
unclear to the Interviewees. The feeling amongst the Interviewees was that they 
needed to continue to carryon accumulating work assignments as a means of 
demonstrating their partner qualities. 
The advice I was always given was, sort of, keep on doing what you're doing 
This advice was clearly followed by one of the Interviewees who commented that, 
during the whole period of the promotion process 
I just carried on doing my job 
Specific guidance as to what the required partner qualities might be was, however, 
notable by it absence. Though the criteria for partnership were published and 
available to associates they were not perceived as useful by the Interviewees. One 
commented as follow s: 
there is a statement of the criteria by which you ' ll be assessed . . .. There's no 
weighting within them .. . [and] it doesn't give you any ultimate yardstick. 
And maybe one wouldn't expect it to , but in one sense it [the criteria] is 
171 Ga lante r and Palay, op. cit. , n. 3, p. 100. 
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unhelpful because it tells you everything you'd expect to be on there . . . .. but 
it doesn ' t answer ultimate issues. 
Once the third phase of the Interviewee's careers as associates commences, the 
formal PPP, the process is perceived by them as a collaborative one. A business plan 
is created by the group to back their partner candidate and any areas that need to be 
worked on by the individual to get through the PPP are identified and often relevant 
assistance provided. One Interviewee summed up the demarcation between the 
middle phase and the PPP neatly when they commented that: 
In terms of actual day to day work I didn't feel as if I had to up my game in a 
particular area .. . In terms of going through the process, I knew I needed to 
work on a couple of things. 
So, during this phase of the process the things that the individual partner candidate 
needed to work on became explicit. 
Preliminary Comments 
During the "middle phase" of the Interviewees' career the standards and 
achievements expected of them as potential partners were vague. They had no clear 
idea of what standard they were being judged against notwithstanding the fact that 
the partnership criteria were published and available to them. However, the 
Interviewees did have a general idea of what was expected of them, that is, they 
were to accumulate work assignments that allowed them to demonstrate their 
partnerial capabilities . Though the advice they were receiving from the partners to 
this effect was lacking in detail it does seem, in fact, to have been what the partners 
wanted them to do . Tellingly, the associates were all allowed the opportunity to 
prove they could do partner level work. 
Moving on to the formal PPP the procedure is a more collaborative one . Though the 
aspects of individual performance for purposes of the PPP are made expl icit, the 
associate still has to rely on the partners in their group to put forward the most 
compelling business case they can in support of the promotion of an additional 
partner. 
Overall, the promotion to partner process is characterised by the proto-partners 
having just enough knowledge and understanding of the process at each stage to 
allow them to work effectively in the pursuit of the partnership goal. However, at no 
point are they aware of what exactly they are able to do to influence their chances of 
b · 172 ecommg a partner. 
172 Wilkins and Gulati , op. cit. , n. 3 , p. 1667 , for and ex pla nation of how this might encourage 
max imum effo rt in all areas. Considered furthcr at page 14 of this work and in footnote 8 1. 
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QlIestion 4 - How do associates weigh lip their chances of becoming a partner?-
Analysis 
As noted at the start of this section, the aim of Question 4 is to unpack what implied 
promise or deal the Interviewees are monitoring during the pre-partner period. The 
Research Question envisages that the implied promise that the associates are 
interested in monitoring is; that a fixed percentage of an associate's "entering class" 
will be promoted to partner in due course and that monitoring of this promise takes 
place via the associate's observation of the "fixed percentage" statistic over time. 
Another way of characterising the monitoring is that it forms part of how the 
associates weigh up their chances of being promoted to partner. 
As considered in some detail in Questions l(b) and l(c) above, the data shows that 
the Interviewees did not use the partner promotion percentage as a means of 
weighing up their chances of becoming a partner, it was not a statistic they felt 
warranted consideration. Hence the significance of this Question 4 lies in asking 
how did the associates weigh up their chances of becoming a partner and does this 
translate into any form of implied promise? However, in order to deal 
comprehensively with this Question 4 we first need to consider those factors that 
mayor may not have assisted associates weigh up their chances and which were 
revealed by the research data but which have not been subject of any consideration 
or analysis above. 
The factors for consideration fall under three headings: 
• inter/intra departmental politics; 
• external economics; and 
• information and feedback from individuals - formal and informal. 
Inter/intra departmental politics - The existence of inter/intra departmental politics 
was acknowledged by all of the Interviewees. However, the prevailing view, 
summed up by one Interviewee in the comment set out below, was that there was 
little to be gained by being concerned with them. 
I think I would say I was substantially oblivious to it [politics] most of the 
time . And subconsciously worked on the basis that the only thing I could 
control was working hard and doing the best job I could one day after the 
next. And so, whether there were politics that were, you know, in play, there 
was nothing I could do about that. 
One factor having political ove110nes that the Interviewees did attach some 
significance to was the influence wielded by their supporters. Their comments 
suggest that they had a good idea of the relative political strengths of their 
supporting partners and of the importance of their role. One commented that : 
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I thought I was being supported by the right people within the ... division, 
yes. Definitely. 
Another summed up the extent of their supporters ' influence by stating that the 
partnership promotion process: 
was collaborative with the head of the department who . . . had a much better 
feel for the likely numbers of promo tees .. . They call it the pipeline. So, 
judging the pipeline was part of what they were doing on my behalf . . . I was 
guided very much through it by the partners who knew what was going on. 
External Economics - Three of the Interviewees regarded external economics as 
significant and part of the reason why partnership was becoming increasingly 
difficult to attain. The following comment was typical : 
It [external economic factors] probably did [impact] on the firm . . . people 
were saying it was getting harder to make partner and the rates [of partner 
promotion] weren't as big. 
However, there was a perception that there was little to be done about these external 
events, summed up by one Interviewee when they stated that: 
you have an underlying fear that the market may do something terrible, but 
I'm quite fatalistic about things like that. There' s nothing I can do about 
that. 
The Interviewees did, however, monitor external economic factors if they thought 
they would have a direct impact on their individual business case. 
Preliminary Comments 
Though both political and external economic factors were acknowledged as capable 
of influencing the Interviewees chances of making partner the overriding feeling was 
that, as these factors were largely outside their control then they would not spend 
time analysing them or worrying about them unduly. Their efforts were, rather, 
concentrated on monitoring and seeking to influence those aspects of their career 
progression that they had a degree of control over. Analysis of the relative influence 
wielded by supporting partners seems to be the only area where any material level of 
energy was expended by the Interviewees. 
Information andfeedbackfrom individuals - formal and informal informationflows 
- Formal and informal information flows derived from processes and individuals 
were deemed, by the Interviewees, to be significant for the weighing up of their 
partnership chances. 
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As regards formal feedback, five of the Interviewees regarded one of either their 
appraisals and/or the five year PQE development centre run by the firm for 
associates as providing key information on their progress towards making partner. 
The two comments below illustrate their feelings. 
Well , I always thought they [chances of making partner] were good. I 
thought it was a matter of time. I mean I'd always had outstanding 
appraisals .. . . I kind offelt I was on track. And knowing what the criteria 
were, knowing that I was consistently ranked at the top and had been since a 
trainee, I presumed it [promotion to partner] was a quality test. 
[A]t about five years qualified I went on what was described as a senior 
associate ' s development centre ... where you are encouraged . . . about , you 
know, the sorts of things that you were doing and were doing currently and 
could do differently or better if you were interested [in partnership]. I 
responded to [it] quite well and found [it] useful. Others mayor may not 
have done. I know I did. 
According to the Interviewees, partners were their prime source of informal 
information on career prospects. In respect of informal feedback, as noted earlier in 
this work173, two Interviewees had experienced strong informal mentor relationships 
and three further Interviewees commented on the strong collaborative efforts of the 
partners in their groups during and in the immediate run-up to the formal PPP. 
So, I had reliable information [from the partners] and that information was 
very promising in terms of the gap, the lack of other senior associates, the 
nature of the business at that time and also the fact that, as I said, I liked 
these people and would be happy to work with them. 
Preliminary Comments 
All information of relevance to their career progression was eagerly seized upon by 
the Interviewees, whether it was received via formal or informal channels. The 
information provided via formal channels was largely confined to how the individual 
was progressing in establishing their partner credentials, whereas the informal 
information flows provided them with data both on progress in establishing partner 
credentials and on the potential strength of the business case within a particular 
gro up for the promotion of additional partners. 
173 See page 39 of this work . 
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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Having covered all aspects of the research data that are of possible relevance to this 
Question 4, I can now address the question itself; how do associates weigh up their 
chances ofbecorrung a partner? I adopt a three step approach: 
I. outlining the factors the Interviewees did not use when they were associates ; 
2. outlining the factors they did use; and 
3. summarising the consequential gaps left in the, then, associates' understanding 
of the partner promotions process. 
Factors Not Used 
Partner promotions as a proportion of "entering class " - Though the Interviewees 
expressed great interest in the absolute number of partners made up each year they 
were not concerned with analysing this number as a function of their "entering 
class" as a means ofweighing up their chances of making partner. 
Inter/Intra departmental politics - This factor was acknowledged as present but 
ignored by the Interviewees as a means of monitoring their chances of making 
partner as they could not influence it. Rather they had to trust that their sponsoring 
partners would act in their best interests. The one exception here was the importance 
attached by the Interviewees to the political influence wielded by their supporters. 
Factors Used 
I list these factors in approximate order of significance, derived from the importance 
attached to them by the Interviewees 
Continued promotion of partners - The bedrock of the Interviewees ' assumptions 
that they had a chance of making partner at their firm. 
Type of work assignment performed - This was considered by the Interviewees to be 
the strongest indicator that they were building their partner credentials. 
Feedback - formal and informal - The Interviewees saw this factor as providing the 
essential underpinning of their chances of partnership promotion. Receiving good 
feedback in their appraisals and supportive feedback from the partners gave the 
Interviewees comfort that they were, at least, not out of the running for partnership. 
Continued hiring of junior lawyers - Though not of ftrst order importance to the 
Interviewees, this factor was regarded as an important indicator of long term 
business confidence on the part of their ftrm , s ignalling that the fLrln would continue 
to be an environment where partners were regularly promoted. 
External economics - This factor was treated fatalistically by the Interviewees and 
only seen as of relevance when it had a clear influence on an individual's business 
case for promotion to partner. It was a factor that the Interviewees saw as the 
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backdrop to their bid for partnership and which was monitored, just in case, anything 
untoward occurred that might affect their promotion chances. 
Gaps in the associates' understanding o/the career progression process 
It is useful at this point to summarise those parts of the career progression process 
that associates have little understanding or appreciation of. Given the dynamics of 
the three stages of their pre-partner career, these gaps are best analysed as they arise 
during each of those stages. 
Early Years - The Interviewees had very little information as to their partner 
credentials or possible business case for partner promotions within their group 
during this period, This is understandable in the case of a potential business case 
which relates to a period perhaps five or more years in the future. In the case of 
partner credentials, feedback specifically on this topic was not provided, even during 
formal appraisals until the "Middle Period" of the Interviewees ' associateship. Some 
information regarding the relative standing of the associates may have been evident 
from relative pay levels after salary review. 
Middle Period 174_ During this period the Interviewees were seeking to establish 
their partner credentials but were given no objective measure of the standards they 
were expected to attain. Rather, they had to rely on the diet of work assignments 
they undertook and the vague assurances of the partners that they should simply 
keep on doing what they had been doing. 
Formal PPP - Though a period characterised by the Interviewees as a 
"collaborative" one, they had little idea of the political manoeuvrings involved in 
their being proposed as a partner. This was especially the case as regards any inter-
departmental trade-offs that might occur. The Interviewees also had to trust that the 
partners in their group would present the best possible business case on their 
behalves. 
Question 5 - Whatpromise are the associates monitoring? - Analysis 
From the analysis based on the research data and carried out above, it is possible to 
say that the Interviewees did not monitor quite the implied promise envisaged by 
tournament theory. 
So does the data suggest that they were monitoring any promise at all, and if yes, 
what was the promise? In considering these questions it is important to revisit two 
elements of tournament theory. 
I. The raison d 'etre of the implied promise is to provide associates with the 
motivation to work hard and to high standards with minimal supervision. The 
174 From approximately two years PQ E. 
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associate's motivation is, in tournament theory, derived from them having a 
readily quantifia ble chance of winning the prize of partnership. 
2. No actual promise is made to the associates. They have to rely on their 
perception of what is on offer to them. Therefore, what they rely on as the basis 
of their perception embodies the " implied promise". That is, they perceive that if 
they do "X" then "Y" will be forthcoming from the frrm, this bargain being the 
"implied promise" 
So what promise are they monitoring, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, 
what "deal" do they perceive to be on offer? The analysis above indicates that while 
the Interviewees were not concerned with monitoring partner promotions based on a 
percentage of "entering class" they were very concerned with observing that partners 
continued to be made up and in what absolute numbers. Given the factors that the 
Interviewees perceived as being important to their chances of being promoted to 
partner, the revised "implied promise or, the deal on offer, might be something along 
the lines set out below. 
We, the firm, will promote to partner those associates who: 
• 
• 
have established their partner credentials through the execution of their 
various work assignments; and 
in combination with their group/department have sufficient human capital 
to add a further partner to the partnership without diluting returns to the 
existing partners. 
Having analysed the Case Study data against the theoretical framework, there is 
circularity, but undeniable logic, inherent in stating that the Interviewees did have 
the ability and the means by which they could monitor their fmn's implied promise. 
If the implied promise/deal is all in the perception of the associates and that 
perception is dependent on what they observe/monitor then they have the means to 
monitor the promise. That is not to deny, however, the existence, at each stage of 
their pre-partner career, of significant uncertainties that they are powerless to 
resolve. So, they may be able to monitor the promise/deal and work out, with a 
degree of accuracy, their chances of becoming a partner but they can never be 
certain of their promotion until it takes place. Further, because the promise/deal is 
only ever " implied", the associates can never be entirely sure that their perception of 
what is needed for them to become a partner is correct and that the promise they are 
monitoring is the right one. This leads us on to the consideration of Question 6. 
Question 6 - Do Associates have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules 
and partners' desires? - Analysis 
In Question 5 I concluded that associates are able to monitor the promise/deal but it 
is a promise/deal perceived by them with no guarantee that it is the correct one. 
However, Galanter and Palay in sett ing out the requirements for the working of the 
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tournament model suggests that for these purposes associates need only have "A 
reasonably accurate understanding of the rules [of the tournament] and the partners ' 
des ires" . 175 
As the implied promise/deal underpins much of the superstructure of the more 
detailed rules of the tournament and, if the tournament does work as a model when 
applied to large law firms in the UK, there is an implication that the associates 
should be able to work out and then go on to monitor the correct promise/deal. 
So, I conclude this section by considering whether the research data and the analysis 
thereof, enables us to infer anything about the Interviewees' state of knowledge and 
understanding of the rules and the partners' desires. 
The Rules 
I use the Galanter and Palay stylised version of the Rules l 76 and make comment only 
on those aspects of the rules that the research data has some bearing upon. 
I . The tournament is played over a fixed period oj time - No relevant data 
gathered. 177 
2. All associates in an "entering class" competeJor the prize oJpartnership - The 
Interviewees perceived only limited competition for partnership slots during 
their careers and there was definitely no feeling of "head to head" competition 
within their "entering class". 
3. The prize is awarded to afLXed percentage oJthe top associates - The 
Interviewees were concerned that partners continued to be made up but did not 
base any analysis of their chances of making partner on the "fixed percentage of 
entering class" formula. The Interviewees' key concern was focussed at group 
level rather than firm wide. That is , that their group would have sufflcient human 
capital to be able to put forward a compelling business case in support of the 
promotion of additional partners. Firm wide levels of partner promotion, 
perversely, became less significant for the Interviewees as they became 
increasingly senior. 
4. The basis on which the award is made is the associate's ranking - judged 
subjectively - in the possession oJtwo goods: 
• high quality legal work; and 
• their own human capital. 
175 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 27, p.1688. 
176 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 34 , p. 95 3. 
177 The notorious lack of senior non-partner lawyers at large law firms, see Legal Bus iness Assistant 
Survey N ovember 2006, Doggett, op. cit. , n. 64, which seems to support this proposition. If an 
assoc iate has not made partner by a certa in leve l ofPQ E the f!fm is unlike ly to keep them on as a 
se nior assoc iate and even if they are kept on th ey are extremely unlikely to make partner. The 
tOLU·nament is no longer ongo ing and has effec tive ly ended for them. 
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The Interviewees were acutely aware and had a deep understanding of this 
particular rule. Subject to one important caveat, it correlates with their 
perception and experience of what they needed to do to have a chance of 
becoming partners. The need for a diet of high quality legal work is borne out by 
the research data. The caveat is that that the relevant measure of "human capital" 
for the purposes of promotion to partner is that of the individual in combination 
with that of their group. Much of the formal PPP is dedicated to proving that the 
combined human capital of individual and group is sufficient to support a further 
partner without diluting the returns to the existing partners. 
The subjectivity of the judgments being made is especially evident when 
considering how the then associates established their partner credentials and the 
lack of an objective "yardstick" against which they could measure their 
performance/abilities. Judgements as to the necessary level of human capital 
possessed by the associate's group may be less subjective than those relating to 
an individuals partner credentials due to the business case approval process. 
5. The winners get a guaranteed andfixed amount o/compensation - regardless 0/ 
who wins - No relevant data gathered. 
6. Associates are reassured that the firm is keeping its side o/the bargain through: 
• consistent and readily observable partner promotion rates; and 
• continued hiring o/new associates 
This rule certainly accords with the perceptions of the Interviewees. Partner 
promotions were ranked considerably higher in importance than continued hiring 
of new associates as a form of reassurance. 
Partners ' Desires 
The desires of the partners provide the basis for the existence of the rules. Put 
another way, the rules of the tournament are a function of the desires of the partners 
that their business should function in a certain manner. The partners' desires might 
be summarised as the desires: 
• to have a work force comprised of assistants who are motivated to work hard in 
the production of quality legal output with the minimum of supervision; and 
• to promote only those associates who, as partners, will maintain or improve the 
existing partners' level of return from their business 
The Interviewees understanding of these partner desires is reflected in the 
importance they attached to : the amount and quality of the work assignments they 
performed; and the business case to be presented on their behalf by their group 
during the PPP. 
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Preliminary Comments 
It is evident that the Interviewees had an accurate understanding of those rules 
relevant to the Research Question. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that their 
monitoring of partner promotion rates is less sophisticated that that envisaged under 
the tournament model; and the relevant measure of human capital for the purposes of 
promotion to partner is that of the proto-partner in combination with their group and 
not solely that of the individual. 
Conclusion - Addressing the Research Question 
Do lawyers at large UK law ftrms have the means by which they can monitor 
their finn's implied promise that a fixed percentage of them will be made up 
to partner in due course? 
The Case Study data and the analysis of that data suggest that the Interviewees did 
have the means to monitor the 'implied promise" or "deaVbargain" relating to their 
chances of being promoted to partner. This is the case notwithstanding that the 
" implied promise" differs in some respects from that envisaged by tournament 
theory. The revised "deal" seems to be just as effective as the "bargain" envisaged 
by the rules in providing the Interviewees with plenty of motivation. Further, the 
Interviewees ' understanding of the rules and partners ' desires as they relate to that 
promise/deal indicates that the promise they are concerned with monitoring is the 
one impliedly offered by their firm. 
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That associates would overwork is unsurprising: they have to show they 
deserve to become partners. This is a central element of the ' tournament 
theory' advanced by Galanter and Palay. Indeed, the five to ten years of 
'grinding' that large-firm associates endure ... is just the latest stage ofa 
treadmill these lawyers stepped on two or even three decades earlier - some 
in kindergarten - in order to demonstrate that they had internalised Weber ' s 
Protestant ethic: the ability to postpone gratification, to keep their noses to 
the grindstone now so as to demonstrate their election to enjoy rewards in the 
after-life of partnership. 
Richard L.Abel ' 78 
Part !VB 
The Questionnaire - Analysis of Questionnaire Data - Testing the Theoretical 
Framework 
Structure used for analysing the data 
Having gathered the field research data in the manner described in Part III, I set 
about analysing it using the structure set out below. 
1. Describe the data and provide preliminary comments. 
2. Use the data and the revised questions set out in Part IVB to test the theoretical 
framework. 
3. Comment on the interplay of the Questionnaire and Case Study data. 
Describing the Data 
I have made use of tables wherever possible to describe the data. I believe this 
makes it quicker and easier for the reader to derive information from the data and it 
makes referring back to particular results within this section a much simpler task. 
For the majority of the tables I have grouped responses under five main headings. 
The headings vary depending on how each specific question is worded, though I 
have sought to keep the groupings as uniform as possible between all relevant data 
sets. The five types of headings I use are: 
178 Richard L. Abel, ' Varieties of Socia l Discipline: Co llective Action in a Law Firm' (2004) 3 1 
Journal of Law and Society 624. 
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• Very Important/Significant/Relevant 
• Important/Significant/Relevant 
• Moderately Important/SignificantlRelevant 
• Not Important/Significant/Relevant 
• Not Applicable/OtherlNo Response 
As the questions themselves are open and do not specify the form that answers are 
bound to take there is a degree of interpretation required in placing answers under 
one particular heading or another. I did not, however, encounter any material 
difficulty in placing responses under the various headings. In the limited situations 
where I did fmd the task troublesome I either draw the reader's attention to it in the 
commentary or do not use a table format for describing that data set. Where I have 
used a different style of table its content is either self explanatory or I have provided 
explanatory notes as necessary. 
The data set comprises thirty Questiormaire responses from twenty male and ten 
female Respondents. The Respondents came from ten different firms. 
Though the Questiormaire data does not have the depth or richness of the Case Study 
data I have again attempted to let the Respondents speak for themselves wherever 
possible and appropriate. If they make a good point or illustrate some issue 
particularly well, I rely on their comment rather than describing what they have 
written. 
Description and Analysis of Questionnaire Data 
Question A 1 (i) 
As ajunior lawyer, how important to your level o/motivation were high wages? 
Describing the data 
Fig 1 
Very 
Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
N/A Other • 
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7 
13 
9 
1 
Preliminary Comments 
The clear message from those who responded to the Questionnaire (the 
"Respondents") is that their wages as junior lawyers were not a major motivational 
factor for them. The key concern that emerges from the responses, and mentioned 
specifically by ten Respondents, is that wages were important only to the extent that 
they were being paid a market rate for their type of firm and the type of work they 
were employed to undertake. The two comments below portray the attitude typical 
of those Respondents who found their wages to be moderately or of no importance. 
Not a major factor. Important to feel as though I was being remunerated at 
market levels but not that I was the highest paid 
Not imperative - but did not want to be underpaid. 
Salaries were seen by most Respondents as comparable across large firms in the City 
of London and individuals were usually making choices between such firms rather 
than between those firms and other careers. As long as ftrms were paying a market 
rate, wages clearly had little motivational impact. However, it is almost certainly the 
case that the potentially demotivating effects of feeling underpaid provide the 
underpinnings of these results. One Respondent summed up this scenario neatly. 
One expects to be paid a decent going rate for their efforts. So, if one 
believes one is being paid below market level then that does have an adverse 
impact on motivation. Certainly, when the firm has, in my opinion, got my 
salary review wrong in the past it has adversely affected my motivation 
because your immediate thoughts are "why bother" with any extra effort 
when you are not being remunerated for it. 
Question Al(U) 
As ajunior lawyer, how important to your level o/motivation was the reputation 0/ 
thefirm? 
Describing the data 
Fig 2 
Very 
• • • • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • Im~ortant 
Not 
• Im~ortant 
N/A Other • 
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Preliminary Comments 
The reputation of their firms was clearly of "critical" importance to these 
Respondents. One Respondent illustrated this point by stating that it was: 
Very important - if not good then I would have moved as soon as I was 
experienced enough to be able to identify a strong firm . 
Even the One Respondent who ranked the motivational impact of reputation as 
unimportant commented that it had been: 
A factor in getting into the firm initially but not one that I thought about ... 
motivating me thereafter. 
Question Al(iii) 
As ajunior lawyer, how important to your level ofmotivation was availability of a 
general legal training - skills non-specific to your firm? 
Describing the data 
Fig 3 
Very 
• • • • Important 
Important • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • • • • Important 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
N/A Other • 
Preliminary Comments 
4 
8 
8 
9 
1 
A wide range of views was evident from the Questionnaire responses. Of those who 
attached little importance to the motivational impact of the availability ofa general 
legal training there was a strong theme that receiving good training was a given 
when working for a major UK firm. Two typical comments are set out below. 
[T]his was taken as read 
I assumed I would receive good training if! worked for a high quality firm. 
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Those Respondents who rated this factor as important or very important to their 
motivation tended to stress that it was of most significance to them as very junior 
lawyers. 
Before I was around 4yrs PQE this was the most important factor, I thought 
being a really good all round lawyer with good technical and commercial 
skills was what the firm 1 was with should be providing so that I could tum 
my hand to any product as needed and if necessary I could go out of the law 
into commerce. 
Very important in my motivation for joining the ftrm where I trained and 
qualified. 
The comments of two Respondents who rated this factor as highly important to their 
motivation are also worth quoting here to illustrate the breadth of the views 
expressed. 
[I]f one has ambition to be a good lawyer, the training to get you to that level 
is an integral factor in this. There must be a structured training program ... 
combined with good on-the-job experience 
[My firm] offered a high level of formal and informal training and I felt 
challenged throughout and therefore able to learn 
Perhaps all that can be safely said on the basis of the data is that the availability of a 
general legal training had at least some motivational impact on most of the 
Respondents, though those who found it to be a highly motivational factor were the 
exception rather than the rule. 
Question A 1 (iv) 
As ajunior lawyer, how important to your level ofmotivation was the opportunity 
for promotion to partnership? 
Describing the data 
Fig 4 
Very 
• • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • Im~ortant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
N/A Other • 
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Preliminary Comments 
Significant numbers of Respondents occupied either end of the opinion spectrum 
with regard to this question, though the data points overall to this factor being 
motivationally important. Typically, those Respondents who did not perceive 
partnership to be a motivating factor as junior lawyers gave answers along the lines 
of 
Very early on this [promotion to partnership] was less of a concern. 
Another Respondent in this group commented that it was: 
Not hugely important but became increasingly important once I decided not 
to move to a bank or industry at about 3 year PQE stage. 
The last quotation illustrates why it is important to consider the data from this 
question in conjunction with the data derived from Question A2, in order to 
determine how the significance of partnership opportunities changed for these 
Respondents over time. The importance attached, by the Respondents to the other 
motivating factors already considered above is also of relevance and I consider this 
issue further now. 
Of the nine Respondents who rated this factor as not motivationally important, the 
overwhelming majority (eight) ranked the reputation of their firm as the most 
important motivational factor for them as junior lawyers. 179 Given the leve l of 
significance attached by the Respondents as a whole to the reputation of their firm 
this is not a surprising finding. However, the importance of the finding lies in the 
fact that it strongly suggests that those junior lawyers who may not be committed to 
a career in large-sca le private legal practice are concerned that they are working for 
a firm that will provide a positive signal of their abilities should they leave. This 
reinforces views expressed by Wilkins and Gulati. 180 
There are a number of interesting aspects that emerge from the analysis of the data 
on the motivational impact of promotion to partner prospects. I briefly consider: 
those aspects relating to how law firms might best set about motivating their 
associates and two points of more genera l interest. 
From a motivational perspective firms should pay particular attention to and bolster, 
wherever possible, their reputation as a firm and especially their reputation for 
turning out good lawyers. This should prove attractive and motivational for those 
junior lawyers not yet committed to a career in a large-scale legal private practice 
but who may well go on to become partners in due course. It will, of course, provide 
179 The remaining Respondent ranked the availab ility of general lega l training as their most important 
motivational force . 
180 Wilkins and Gu lati , op. cit. , n. 3, p. 1640 and considered further in Part II at page 15 of thi s work . 
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an additional source of motivation for those lawyers who already see the chance of 
promotion to partnership as an attractive and motivational proposition. 
The data also suggests that many junior lawyers are sensitive to messages as to their 
chance of making partner from early on in their careers. Negative or, the absence of, 
messages in this regard might well have a demotivating effect on these junior 
lawyers. 
Moving on to the two more general points, it is interesting to note, though beyond 
the scope of this thesis to develop, that there was also a clear gender split in the data 
on the motivational impact of the prospect of partnership on junior lawyers. Of the 
nine Respondents highly motivated by partnership, eight were men. Of those who 
were not motivated by partnership in the early stages of their careers six were female 
out of a total of ten female Respondents. 
Further, while acknowledging the small size of the sample and the difficulty of 
comparison between the questions posed, it is interesting to note that, as with the 
Case Study data, the levels of interest shown by the Respondents in the prospect of 
partnership resembles that found in the November 2006 Legal Business Assistant 
Survey, \ 8 \ which solicited responses from current law firm associates. 
Question A2 
How did the general level a/importance a/the/actors set out in Question Al change 
over time? 
Describing the data 
The importance of partnership was noted by eighteen of the Respondents as 
increasing over time . Nine Respondents felt that there was no or very little change in 
the relative motivational impact of the various incentives. Three Respondents saw 
the firm's reputation as an increasingly important motivational factor. The remainder 
of the responses provided little clear data. One Respondent felt training had become 
more important while four commented that it had become less important. Seven 
Respondents felt wages became less important to them over time but two felt they 
became more important. It is important to note that some Respondents gave more 
than one area as increasing or decreasing in importance to their motivation over 
time. 
Preliminary Comments 
The increas ing importance attached to partnership prospects over time is to be 
expected given the career profile of the Respondents. Equally unsurprising is the fact 
that seven out of the nine Respondents who were not motivated by the prospect of 
partnership as junior lawyers were in the majority group who found this prospect of 
18 1 Doggett , op. c it. , n. 64. 
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partnership increasingly motivational over time. The other two relevant Respondents 
indicated that the relative importance of the various incentives had remained 
unchanged, for both of these Respondents their main motivation under Question Al 
was the reputation of their firm. 
Question A3 
When did becoming a partner start to be your prime motivation? 
Describing the data 
Fig 5 below sets out, along the horizontal axis, the level ofPQE at which each 
Respondent felt promotion to partner became their prime motivation. The final right 
hand column indicates those Respondents for whom partnership was never a prime 
motivating factor. 
Fig 5 
4 
• 
• 
• 
• 
PQE 0 
Key 
o 4 2 3 9 2 3 1 2 
0 
0 
• 
• 
• 
*0 • *. 0 *. 0 
• • *. *. *0 0 0 
• • *. • • 0 • • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Not a factor 
Respondents who, as junior lawyers, rated promotion to partnership as: 
• 
• o 
• 
very important 
important or moderately important 
not important 
no response to Question A1 (iv) 
Where a Respondent has indicated a range of dates during which 
partnership became their prime motivation I have used the earliest date 
indicated and placed an * asterix next to the relevant symbol. 
- 67 -
Preliminary Comments 
The data shows a definite peak around five years PQE when partnership started to 
become a prime motivation for the Respondents. Notably there are a significant 
number (eight) who had partnership as a prime motivation from very early on in 
their careers, that is, between zero and two years PQE. 
It is also worth noting the points in time at which those Respondents who did not 
feel partnership was a motivating factor early in their career (and rewesented in Fig 
5 by symbol "0") found that it had become their prime motivation. 82 Given the 
data, and as one might expect for individuals who did not fmd partnership promotion 
a motivating force as junior lawyers, the point at which partnership did become a 
prime motivation for them was significantly later than for the majority of the 
Respondents, while for those who found it to be a very important motivating force as 
junior lawyers the relevant point in time was correspondingly earlier. 
A further point of interest is that five of the Respondents indicated that a particular 
incident prompted their focus to be directed at their partnership prospects. This is 
considered further in the analysis of Question C3. 
Question A4 
Once becoming a partner became your prime motivation, how, if at all, did your 
behaviour at work change? 
Describing the data 
Unsurprisingly, the one Respondent who at no point in time ever had partnership as 
a prime motivation indicated that the question was not applicable to them. Twelve 
Respondents commented that no change occurred in their behaviour once 
partnership became their prime motivation. Those who did change their behaviour 
mentioned a variety of areas in which this occurred, namely: 
• Preparedness to work harder and seek and take on greater responsibilities (8) 
• Working harder on developing their own clients (5) 
• Achieving greater exposure to other partners within their firm (5) 
• Taking on management roles (2) 
182 One of these Respondents continued to fee l th at partnership was never a prime motiva tion and the 
Respondent included in th e 2 years PQE co lumn ac tua ll y stated th at paltnership became the ir prime 
motivation " Between 2 and 5 years PQE" . 
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Three Respondents also noted that they had become more "stressed" and irritable 
once they had decided to go for promotion to partnership. Their comments follow. 
[1]n my drive for partnership I believe 1 became somewhat self-obsessed, 
tense, suspicious and focussed too much on detail and not the big picture 
I probably appeared less approachable; bit more grumpy with junior lawyers . 
I became racked with uncertainty. You realJy didn't know whether you'd get 
there. It all became linked to the last Q[uarterJ's results. Business cases 
evaporated and reappeared in short order. 
Preliminary Comments 
The data suggests that many of the Respondents were either: confident enough in 
their own abilities to achieve the role of partner without feeling they had to change 
the way in which they went about their work; or had a good grasp of what was 
needed of them if they were to gain promotion. The changed behaviours mentioned 
are in areas that exhibit a combination of the accumulation of human capital and 
finding opportunities for demonstrating their partner credentials, all essential 
elements of their "partnerial package". 
Questions BJ and B2 
1. A t what point in time, if ever, did you f eel that you were competing with others for 
a limited number of partnership slots? (please consider the whole of your legal 
career - not just run-up to partnership) 
2. Who was the competition? 
Describing the data 
Given the nature of the data sets for these questions I have chosen to consider 
Questions B I and B2 together. Fig 6 sets out, along the horizontal axis , the level of 
PQE at which the Respondents felt they were in competition with others for 
partnership s lots. The final two right-hand columns indicate those Respondents who , 
respectively: 
• felt they had not experienced such competition; or 
• experienced competition but gave a response too vague to identify when it 
had occurred. 
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Fig 6 
2 0 3 2 3 6 2 0 0 1 8 3 
• 
• 
0 • 
*. • 
*. • 0 0 • • • 0 • *. *. • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • 
PQE 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 None Vague 
Key 
• POE given 0 No specific POE given but sufficiently clear to estimate 
POE -
for example "Always" or "junior lawyer" 
Where a Respondent has indicated a range of dates during which they 
experienced competition I have used the earliest date indicated and placed 
an • asterix next to the relevant symbol. 
Fig 7 shows the sources of competition experienced by the Respondents. Note that 
some Respondents identified competit ion as coming from more than one source. 
Fig 7 
Colleagues 
within own • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • de~art . 
Firm-wide • • • 
Lateral Hires • • Peers/ 
• • • • Contem~oraries 
None/N/A • • • • • • • • 
Fig 6 indicates that eight Respondents fe lt that they experienced no competition 
during their pre-partner careers. In Fig 7 the same eight Respondents , unsurprisingly, 
appear in the very bottom row as not having identified any competitors. Of these 
Respondents it is worth noting that , for a variety of reasons, they had had a "clear 
run" at partnership promotion. The follow ing two comments are good examples. 
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15 
3 
2 
4 
8 
A number of senior associates left early in my ... [ career] so I always had a 
fairly clear run together with I other associate who also made partner at same 
time and indications were always that there was 2 places available 
I was in an expanding area ... and there were few competitors for the 
partnership slot within the firm at the time 
The remainder of the Respondents all experienced some degree of competition at 
some time during their pre-partner career and, three Respondents aside, they were 
quite specific as to when this occurred. 
The fifteen Respondents who indicated they had felt intra-departmental competition 
identified a variety of potential competitors and not just departmental peers. The 
comments below illustrate how both more junior and more senior lawyers as well as 
direct contemporaries, were all variously seen as the competition. 
In the run-up to partnership I felt I was in competition with 2 others in my 
department (one was several years more qualified and the other the same 
level of qualification) 
Other corporate partner candidates at same level PQE. 
As a middle assistant, there were two more senior assistants working in a 
similar practice area to me ... I did not feel that there were any more senior 
fee earners "blocking my way". However, there were two more junior fee 
earners who I felt viewed me as competition and, to an extent, I was aware 
that they were coming up behind me. 
It is worth pointing out that the four Respondents who mentioned that they felt 
competition from their peers/contemporaries did not, between them, have a 
consistent view of who their contemporaries were. For example, one of the four saw 
them as: 
My contemporaries within a 2-3 yr band of my PQE 
While another felt that they were: 
lawyers who were both senior and at the same level as me 
Which encapsulates virtually all lawyers within the firm. 
Preliminary Comments 
The data indicates that it was relatively rare for the Respondents to experience 
competition from the outset of their careers. For those who felt they had experienced 
competition, and there a significant number who did not, their experience occurs in a 
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variety of ways and on a variety of time scales. The two statements set out below 
provide comprehensive examples of where Respondents felt competition carne from 
at various points in time. 
When I was about 4 years PQE I was concerned by the number of more 
qualified assistants in my dept and felt I would have to wait a long time 
before my "turn". I was assured that others wouldn't be given priority simply 
because they were more qualified in terms of years PQE. In the run up to 
partnership I felt I was in competition with 2 others in my department (one 
was several years more qualified and the other the same level of 
qualification) and also the others on our senior assistants development 
pro gramme. 
In the first 3 to 4 years there were about 20 associates in my department. 
Most of these were very strong . .. Of these I regarded my competition as: 3 
lawyers at the same level PQE, 2 who were I year more qualified, 1 who was 
6 months more qualified, and I who was 6 months less qualified. I regarded 
these as my main competition. Some of these gradually fell away for one 
reason or another ... and it also became clear that I was pulling ahead of the 
competition .. . At this stage (i.e . at about 4/5 years PQE) my competition 
became 4 of the 5 or so lawyers who were about 3 years more qualified than 
me. I was aware that if more than 1 of these was made up, then I would 
probably not be. At about 6 years PQE I also became aware that , the firm 
would limit the number of partners generally and therefore I had to compete 
with those in other departments to demonstrate the stronger business case. 
Where it did arise, competition was often an intra-departmental phenomenon, 
peaking during the years in which the associates might be expected to have 
established or be establishing their partnership credentials, around the five years 
PQE mark. Though some of the competition comes from direct peers within the 
same departments the Respondents certainly do not focus on their, or anybody 
else's, "entering class" as the source of competition. 
Question Cl 
A t what point did you start to weigh up, in earnest, your chances of becoming a 
partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 8 sets out, along the horizontal axis, the level ofPQE at which the Respondents 
indicated that they started to weigh-up, in earnest, the ir chances of becoming a 
partner. 
- 72 -
Fig 8 
1 o 2 
• 
• • 
PQE o 1 2 
* 
5 4 
*. 
*. *. 
• *. 
• *. 
• • 
3 4 
10 
*. *. 
*. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5 
4 
• 
• 
• 
• 
6 
2 
• 
• 
7 
o 
8 
Respondent has indicated a range of dates -
earliest date used 
1 1 
• • 
9 N/A 
It is striking that when the level ofPQE in Fig 8 is compared, for each Respondent, 
with the PQE level at which promotion to partner becomes their prime motivation 
(Fig 5) there is very little divergence. Of the thirty Respondents there are only four 
instances where the two dates differ by more than one year. This coincidence 
suggests that, as associates, most of the Respondents were not primarily motivated 
by the opportunity for promotion to partnership until such time as they were able to 
weigh up their chances in a meaningful way. The cluster of responses around the 
five years PQE mark, in Fig 8, indicates that the advent of serious consideration of 
partnership prospects peaks during the period when the Respondents might be 
expected to have established or be establishing their partnership credentials. 
Fig 9 illustrates another interesting aspect of the data. Set out along the horizontal 
axis is the difference in years, for each Respondent, between the point where 
promotion to partnership became their prime motivation and the point at which they 
were made partner. Where a Respondent has indicated a range of dates during which 
partnership became their prime motivation I have used the earliest date. 
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Fig 9 
No. of 
Years 
o 
o 
3 11 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
1 2 
10 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
3 
1 3 o 1 1 
• 
• 
• • • • 
4 5 6 7 N/A 
The data provides a striking illustration of the relative uniformity of the time lapse. 
Twenty one of thirty Respondents weighed up their chances of promotion, in 
earnest, two or three years prior to being promoted. 
Preliminary Comments 
Considering the data sets illustrated in Figs 6, 7, 8 and 9 as a whole, we can say that 
these Respondents weigh up their chances of making partner broadly during the 
same period when partnership becomes their prime motivation. These occurrences, 
for many of the Respondents, take place at a point when they have had some 
opportunity to establish their partnership credentials and peak around the five year 
PQE level. This also happens to mirror the points in time when the force of 
competition for partnership slots was felt by those Respondents who experienced 
such a situation. The coincidence in time of these elements of the Respondent 's 
experiences, namely: 
• opportunity to establish partner credentials and thereby accumulate human 
capital; 
• earnest weighing up of partnership chances, indicating they have an 
understanding of their position and what is needed of then if they are to be 
promoted to partner; and 
• for some, the experience of competition for partnership slots 
appear to indicate the presence of significant aspects of the "tournament" for a 
majority of the Respondents once they have reached the level of senior associate. 
However, it is very important not to lose sight of the fact that there is still a sizeable 
minority, within the context of the sample, who are motivated by the prospect of 
partnership from early on in their careers and who weigh up their promotion chances 
correspondingly early. 
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Question C2(i) 
What information didformal appraisals provide you with as to your chances of 
becoming a partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 10 
Very 
• • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • • • Im~ortant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
N/A Other 
Of note is that eight Respondents commented that the feedback they received at 
appraisals was usually of a very general nature. 
I got general warm noises but I suspected that everyone got these. 
4 
9 
7 
10 
0 
Specifically, four Respondents mentioned that the feedback they got was generally: 
"you' re on the right track" type comments 
Question C2(ii) 
What information did salary level and any bonus you received each year provide 
you with as to your chances of becoming a partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 11 
Very 
• • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • Important 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
N/A Other 
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14 
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Of those who felt that salary/bonus levels provided no useful information to them on 
their chances of promotion to partner, three mentioned that this would continue to be 
the case unless and until the salaries/bonuses paid to their contemporaries were 
known to them. The comment below from one Respondent neatly illustrates this 
point. 
Not generally [useful] because I had no way of telling what this reflected. I 
was aware it was the same as at least one of my peers in terms ofPQE, until 
about 5 or 6 PQE when I became aware I got slightly more than her, and this 
suggested I was ahead. 
A further four Respondents commented that they felt there was no link between 
being well paid compared to one's peers and one's chances of making partner. The 
following two comments are illuminating. 
[N]ot a good indicator as it was clear getting top salary and bonus did not 
favour you because there would be people who would not make it but would 
get the same because the fIrm wanted to keep them on as good work horses. 
I knew that I was always paid at the top of my band and I took 
encouragement from this. However, in hindsight I can see that level of pay as 
an associate does not necessarily equate to your prospects as a partner. 
Preliminary Comments 
One possible explanation for the variation in importance ascribed to salary/bonus 
levels by the Respondents is that their respective fIrms attach differing levels of 
importance to them. However, a more detailed consideration of the data scotches this 
theory. There is no consistency in the importance attributed to salary/bonus levels by 
as between Respondents from the same fum. 183 So, it seems that the divergence in 
opinion illustrated in Fig 11 is probably down to individual perception. 
Question C2(iii) 
What information did work ass ignments you undertook (including the f eedback you 
received on the work you did) provide you with as to your chances of becoming a 
partner? 
183 In one case, even as between two Respondents within the same department. 
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Describing the data 
Fig 12 
Very 
• • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • • Imeortant 
Not 
• • Im~ortant 
N/A Other • • 
The comment set out below is typical of those who attributed high levels of 
importance to the diet of work they received. 
4 
16 
6 
2 
2 
Very clear in banking during that period, the premium, high profile work was 
in leveraged fmance. Very hard to make it without receiving a steady diet of 
this work and not enough of it to feed all associates. 
Three Respondents referred specifically to the importance of receiving a steady flow 
of demanding work assignments in giving them the confidence to feel that they 
could work at partner level. Two specific comments are set out below. 
My role on certain projects and the fact that I was acting "as a partner" when 
still an associate, was important to my confidence in my ability to operate at 
partner level. 
I became aware that I was comfortable taking responsibility for increasingly 
significant transactions which would typically be overseen by a partner, and I 
think this improved my self-confidence (and made me think that I could take 
on the responsibilities of partnership) and the confidence of the partners in 
my abilities. 
Of interest is that two Respondents commented that all associates in their group 
were treated equally when it came to work allocation. One of them then, however, 
goes on to develop their answer by indicating that, equal treatment notwithstanding, 
how they performed on those work assignments still provided an important source of 
information as to their partnership promotion prospects. 
Preliminary Comments 
The data here really speaks for itself. Work assignments were perceived as a 
significant source of information on partnership chances by the majority of the 
Respondents. 
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Question C2(iv) 
What information did individuals at your workplace (e.g. partners, HR, peers, 
mentors formal or informal) provide you with as to your chances of becoming a 
partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 13 
Very 
• • • • • • • • • • Im~ortant 
Important • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • Im~ortant 
Not 
• • Im~ortant 
N/A Other • 
10 
15 
2 
2 
1 
Twenty-one of the twenty-five Respondents who found information from individuals 
at their work place to be an important, or very important, source of information on 
the partnership prospects indicated that the source they most relied upon for relevant 
information were partners at their firm. 
Preliminary Comments 
The data here is unequivocal. Information from individuals was regarded by the 
Respondents as providing significant intelligence as to their chances of promotion to 
partner. Equally clear is that this information was almost exclusively provided by the 
existing partners at the firm. While this may not be a surprising result, the uniformity 
of the responses is noteworthy. 
One further interesting aspect of the data is that three individuals contrasted the 
significance offormal appraisals with that of information supplied informally by 
partners. The two following comments sum up this sentiment. 
A partner in the department who acted as an informal mentor gave me 
encouraging messages on the lines that I was a favourite, from about 4 years 
[PQE], and from this I became aware that "the competition" was receding. 
The message was consistent with appraisals but more frank/with fewer 
caveats. 
Inevitably this [informal dialogue with partners] was the most important 
source of information. People will always say more informally than they will 
say "on the record". 
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This may go some way to explaining why the Respondents do not hold formal 
appraisals in particularly high regard as a source of information on their partnershjp 
prospects. 
Question C3 
Do any particularly important incidents spring to mind when you think ofhow you 
came by the information that helped you weigh up your chances? If yes, what were 
those incidents? 
Describing the data 
Six Respondents stated that no particular incident was particularly significant in 
providing information to them on their chances of promotion to partner. Two 
Respondents indicated that an incident had taken place but their answers failed to 
indicate what information had been elicited from it. One Respondent did not provide 
an answer. 
The remaining twenty-one Respondents reported various specific instances as 
having provided them with information on their chances of makillg partner and some 
Respondents cited more than one incident. The broad types of incidents experienced 
by the Respondents and which provided them with information on their partnershjp 
chances are set out below. 
• Twelve Respondents mentioned informal discussions with partners, four of these 
Respondents reported that these discussions occurred as a result of them 
resignillg from the firms where they eventually became partner. A further 
Respondent stated that it was their welcome on returning to their firm after 
working abroad for a time that made them realise "I was held in high regard." 
• Four Respondents cited specific formal appraisals. 
• The remainder of the specific instances covered a variety of scenarios ranging 
from: 
• being informed that contemporaries had been "given a message to look 
elsewhere"; 
• to an administrative "cock-up" which disclosed to associates "precisely 
how to go about it [the promotion to partner process]"; 
• to the carrying out of a "cull" of"natural "rivals". 
Preliminary Comments 
The most telling pieces of information revealed by these responses is how important 
the non-formal channels of communication (primarily with partners) are in providing 
information to the associates on their partnership chances and on how few occasions 
- 79 -
their appraisals provided specific and memorable information. The role of formal 
appraisals in a broader sense has been considered under Question C2 above. 
Question D(;) 
To what extent did you feel departmental and/or inter-departmental politics were 
relevant when weighing up your chances of becoming a partner: 
Describing the data 
Fig 14 
Very 
• • • • • • • • Relevant 
Relevant • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • Relevant 
Not 
• • • • • • Relevant 
N/A Other • • 
Preliminary Comments 
8 
9 
5 
6 
2 
The extent to which intra or inter-departmental politics was perceived as having an 
in fluence on the Respondents ' chances 0 f becoming a partner depends on their 
individual circumstances and mind set. However, a clear majority identified politics 
as a relevant influencing factor. It is also significant to note that six of the 
Respondents identified the strength of their department relative to that of others 
within their firms as a crucial inter-departmental political factor. The three following 
comments are typical and the fmal two illustrate the point from each side of the 
Issue : 
Undoubtedly departmental politics mattered a great deal, it continues to be 
true that "strong" departments will be able to get more candidates through 
the process, whether it is strength in financial performance or historical client 
links, senior partners etc 
Relevant to some degree, in the sense that we are a corporate firm and hence 
the largest number of partners are corporate partners, whereas those of us in 
support departments have to manage on worse ratios. 
Very important - corporate is the leading department of the firm, so obtaining 
its backing was instrumental. 
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Question D(ii) 
To what extent did you feel that the influence wielded by your supporter(s) (i.e. 
patronage) was relevant when weighing up your chances of becoming a partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 15 
Very 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • Relevant 
Relevant • • • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • Relevant 
Not 
• Relevant 
N/A Other 
Preliminary Comments 
14 
11 
4 
1 
0 
The data provides a clear picture: the Respondents felt the influence wielded by their 
supporters was a significant factor in how they weighed up their chances of 
promotion to partner. With few objective measures by which to judge the 
performance of lawyers (billable hours being the notable exception 184) it is almost 
inevitable that the support of powerful individuals within the business is crucial to 
an associate's career progression. 
The following comments illustrate just how important some of the Respondents 
considered this factor to be. 
Very important. It is always a risk to make someone up - therefore you need 
a partner to stick their neck out and put you on the agenda 
Yes I had one particularly influential champion. Without him pushing I 
wouldn't have got there. Again, an excellent candidate with no champion 
won't get there anytime, not just in current market conditions. 
This was absolutely key and perhaps the single most important factor. Put 
simply, I would not have stood a chance of partnership promotion if I did not 
have support from the partners in my department ... the backing of my head 
of department was key in terms of persuading the partners in other 
departments that it was a good move to promote me. 
184 Co nsidered fiJrther at page 46 of this work and see Gulati et ai , op. c it. , n. 6 1. 
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Question D(;;;) 
To what extent did you feel external economic factors were relevant when weighing 
up your chances of becoming a partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 16 
Very 
• • • • • • • Relevant 
Relevant • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • Relevant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • Relevant 
N/A Other • 
For those who felt strongly that external economics were a relevant factor the 
comment set out below was typical. 
7 
9 
5 
8 
1 
I was aware this was highly relevant because the size of the partnership 
profits dictated to some degree how many partners would be made up. 
During the economic downturn when corporate deals fell and profits suffered 
there was not much willingness to share a small pie! 
Four Respondents made a direct connection between external economics and the 
impact they might have on their own business case. There were discrepancies, 
though, between Respondents as to what constituted external economic factors and 
what constituted internal economic factors. 
A variety of reasons were cited by those who did not consider external economics as 
a relevant factor in weight up their chances of promotion to partnership. Among 
them were the following two comments: 
Not very important. I was made up in the midst of the start of the Iraq War. 
The managing partner made it clear they were taking a "long term view". 
Not as important as internal assessment of business needs. Law firms are 
very slow to react to market pressures. 
Preliminary Comments 
Though there is a clear emphasis on the importance of external economic factors 
there is a lso a wide divergence in opinion and experience evident from the data. 
Overall the data illustrates a distinction between those Respondents who felt that 
- 82 -
external economic factors would impact on their chances of making partner and 
those who were working in an environment where the internal business case was 
strong enough to make external economic factors irrelevant for them. This might be 
the case, for example, where the firm had taken a commercial decision to invest in a 
particular practice area or where an area was perceived as needing "new blood." 
[T]he firm had decided to invest in the bank fmance area hence their 
willingness to take lateral hires into the partnership 
Very relevant now, but less so at the time (when the department needed to be 
reinvigorated). 
Question D(iv) 
To what extent did you feel the rate at which partners were made up was relevant 
when weighing up your chances of becoming a partner? 
Describing the data 
Fig 17 
Very 
• • • • • Relevant 
Relevant • • • • • • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • • • Relevant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • Relevant 
N/A Other • • • 
Preliminary Comments 
It is worthwhile noting that a significant number of Respondents did not consider 
this to be a relevant factor when weighing up their chances of making partner. 185 
5 
9 
5 
8 
3 
None of those Respondents who ascribed at least some relevance to partner 
promotion rates mentioned that they were concerned with the rate of partner 
promotions as a function of the size of all the relevant "entering classes" or 
equivalent. Five Respondents mentioned, specifica lly, their departmental promotion 
rates as being particularly significant and the following comment is typical: 
185 It wou ld have been nice to have had the opportunity to ask them a follow-up question along the 
lines of "how would you have felt if your firm had had a very poor record of making-up partners over 
the la st five years?" 
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Mixed - regular promotions to partnership are a positive sign that the team is 
growing but can count against further partners if there is a perception that too 
many have been made up in a particular area 
Two Respondents made particular reference to the fact that a recent lack of partner 
promotions within their departments was beneficial to their chances of being 
promoted: 
Helpful that lack of senior associates ahead of me so few partner promotions 
in team before mine 
within my department I think I benefited from there having been few recent 
internal promotions. 
One particularly interesting comment sets out, according to the Respondent, how the 
nature of the partnership promotions process and rates of promotion themselves have 
changed at their fum. 
This was highly relevant. When I first qualified, partners were being made up 
across the firm at a rate of 6/7 a year. Later this fell to I or 2 a year. I was 
aware that this reflected a desire to limit the number of partners and a greater 
focusing on the business case: I would need to show a compelling business 
need to make me up and being a good lawyer would not be enough, whereas 
a few years before, there was more "he/she is a good chap, we don't want to 
lose him/her, so we'd better make him/her a partner" 
This comment and one other make a particular point about the importance attached, 
latterly, to the strength of an individual ' s business case in contrast to the lesser 
importance attached to a firm 's rate of partner promotions. 
Yes [a relevant factor] - but my personal business case was more critical. 
Question D(v) 
To what extent did you f eel that the continued hiring of trainees and other junior 
lawyers was relevant when weighing up your chances of becoming a partner? 
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Describing the data 
Fig 18 
Very 
• • Relevant 
Relevant • • • • 
Moderately 
• • • Relevant 
Not 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Relevant 
N/A Other • • • 
Preliminary Comments 
The continued hiring of junior lawyers by their fIrms was perceived by a large 
proportion of the Respondents as not relevant to their chances of promotion to 
partner. However, nine Respondents specifIcally mentioned the importance of the 
partner to non-partner ratio within their flTms/departments as crucial to the ability to 
make up further partners. The following two comments illustrate this point neatly. 
This [the partner to non-partner ratio] was highly relevant because I knew 
that unless we continued to hire, there would be no business case to make up 
more partners. 
It was important that the number of junior lawyers in my team was 
expanding as it demonstrated the ability to generate revenue. 
Of note is that, of these nine Respondents, four perceived the continued hiring of 
junior lawyers as not relevant to their chances of promotion to partner. So whjle they 
appreciated that partner to non-partner leverage was an important factor continued 
hiring gave them no comfort as to their chances of making partner. 
Three Respondents noted that continued hiring of junior lawyers gave a general 
indication of business confIdence within their fIrm but only one of them considered 
this factor to have any signifIcance for their chances of promotion to partner. For 
completeness, their three comments are set out below. 
Very important to show that management feels that there is growth in the 
business area. 
• 
I didn't think about this as particularly relevant but signs of general growth of 
the flTm were obviously important. 
Same as above [not signifIcant] - all a sign ofgrowing economic confIdence 
when hiring is occurring and usually a sign of impending recess ion. 
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2 
4 
3 
18 
3 
Testing the Theoretical Framework and Interplay with Case Study Findings 
In this section of Part IVB I test the Questionnaire data against the theoretical 
framework developed in Part IV A. I have already analysed, in Part IVB, the nature 
of the questions that I use to test the theoretical framework and refer the reader to 
that analysis for an explanation of the purpose and importance of each question. 186 
In order to render the data more digestible, I describe the interplay between the 
Questionnaire findings and the Case Study fmdings for each element of the 
theoretical framework. With regard to the interplay of the two sets of data, it is 
important to bear in mind that the Questionnaire data and findings will not possess 
the richness and depth of their Case Study counterparts. What I have attempted to do 
is point out areas where differences exist between the two sets of data/findings 
and/or where points made in one data set are reinforced or amplified by the fmdings 
of the other. 
Testing the Theoretical Framework 
Question 1 (a) - when does the tournament become the prime motivating factor for 
associates? - Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
Equa l numbers of Respondents occupy either end of the spectrum on this question. 
The actual timing of when the tournament, in this context promotion to partner, 
becomes their prime motivation seems to depend, unsurprisingly, on the 
Respondents motivations as junior lawyers. It is very clear, however, that the 
prospect of promotion to partner becomes increasingly important to the Respondents 
over time and that by the five or six years PQE level it is the prime motivation for a 
significant majority (24/30) of them. This still begs the question as to how the 
tournament and the behaviours of the significant minority motivated from early in 
their careers 187 by the prospect of partnership influence the working practices of 
others who do not share those motivations. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
The Questionnaire data backs up the preliminary comments on the Case Study data 
in that the relevant group for the purposes of monitoring the "implied promise" 
includes a significant number of associates from very early on in their careers and is 
not just confmed to the ranks of senior associates. 
186 See Part IVA, at page 35 onwards, of this work. 
187 See Question A3 at page 67 of this work. 
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Question 1 (b) - who are the "entering class" for the purposes of monitoring the 
partnership promotion rate? - Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
Two aspects of the data warrant consideration, namely: what competition, if any, 
was felt by the Respondents; and did any of them use "entering class" as a 
comparator when considering partner promotion rates? 
On the first question a significant minority (8/30) indicated they had not felt 
competition, while the remainder had felt at least some competition at various points 
in time (peaking at five years PQE) and from a variety of sources. Competition from 
within their own department was the most frequently cited source. As to the second 
aspect of the data, there was no evidence to indicate that the Respondents were 
concerned with competition coming from their own "entering class", nor any 
evidence that they considered the ratio of "entering class" to partner promotions as 
of any significance. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
The Questionnaire data reflects the Case Study data on this point. Though a 
significant number of Respondents perceived that they had experienced some form 
of competition there was nothing to suggest that: they perceived their, or anyone 
else's, "entering class" as the corps with which they were competing; nor that they 
used the promotion percentage of "entering class" as a means of monitoring their 
own chances of promotion to partner. 188 
Question 1 (c) - do associates, when weighing up their chances of becoming a 
partner, take into account the partner promotion percentage and/or continued 
hiring of junior lawyers? - Analysis 
Theore tical Framework 
Partner Promotion Percentage - Few of the Respondents (4/30) considered this to 
be a highly relevant factor when considering their own chances of promotion to 
partner and a significant number (8/30) gave it no importance in this regard. 
However, given the depth of analysis evident in some of the comments regarding the 
"double-edged" nature of positive firm-wide and departmental promotion rates, a 
number of the Respondents had 0 bviously paid close attention to the rate of partner 
promotions and what it meant for the ir chances. 
Continued hiring o/ junior lawyers - This was not generally perceived by the 
Respondents as a re levant factor though the importance of departmental leverage 
188 Also , as co nsidered later in this section, when questioned on the re levance of partner pro motion 
rates to their chances of promo tion, none of the Respondents made any reference to "ente ring class" 
or s imilar as a usefu l fac tor for comparative purposes. 
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(that is, the partner to non-partner ratio) to the firm's ability to promote partners in 
the future was noted by several Respondents. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
Partner Promotion Percentage - No analysis by the Respondents of promotion rates 
relative to "entering class" was revealed by the Questionnaire data. Aside from this 
finding, the Questionnaire Date exhibits a markedly more equivocal stand on the 
importance of partner promotion rates than does the Case Study data. Given the 
significant number of Respondents that did not regard this as a relevant factor, the 
Questionnaire data cannot be said to provide the clear-cut and positive opinions on 
the relevance of partner promotion rates that is evident in the Case Study data. 
However, the obvious level of analysis undertaken by some Respondents and the 
fact that an overall majority of the Respondents did perceive promotion rates to be 
of, at least, some relevance means that the importance of this factor should not be 
discounted .189 
Continued hiring of junior lawyers - The Questionnaire data complements the Case 
Study data with regard to the relevance of this factor for the Respondent's chances 
of promotion to partner. Sentiments, in the Case Study data, to the effect that the 
continued hiring of junior lawyers provides an indicator of business confidence are 
echoed in the Questionnaire data. Although, the feeling that continued hiring is not 
directly relevant to their chances of promotion is, perhaps, borne out more 
emphatically in the Questionnaire data. 
Question 2(a) - does the research data provide any evidence of the "seeding" 
and/or "tracking" of associates? - Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
Seeding - No data was obtained relevant to the phenomenon of "seeding" . 
Tracking - Though a small number of Respondents mentioned aspects of "mentor" 
style relationships the Questionnaire data provides insufficient depth to infer any 
material incidence of "tracking". Equally, the Questionnaire data on work allocation 
considered under Question 2(b) is of insufficient depth to allow any inferences to be 
made as to its impact on potential "tracking" scenarios. 
189 One explanation fo r the differences between the data sets may stem from th e strong cultura l 
commitment to continued partner promotions that is ev ident at the Case Study fi rm. This may be at 
odd s with the culture of the majority of the firms from wh ich the Respondents are drawn. Further 
investigation to sub stantia te this po int is needed. It is also worth noting that the Research data lies 
so mewhere between the views ofGalanter and Pa lay (op. cit. , n. 34) regarding the importance of th e 
"entering class" percentage and Wilkins and Gulati (o p. c it. , n. 3 , pp 1623 - 1624) who regard the 
partner percentage as ne ither c lear nor credible enough to reassure assoc iates. Considered fh rther at 
page 14 of this work. 
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Interplay with Case Study Data 
No data on "seeding" was revealed by the Case Study data and no useful analysis of 
the interplay between the data sets can be undertaken regarding ' tracking" given the 
paucity of the Questionnaire data on this topic. 
Question 2(b) - does the research data provide any evidence of a distinction 
between "paper work" and "training work" and the importance of the latter in the 
promotion to partner process? - Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
The Respondents attach a clearly expressed importance to the diet of work that they 
undertake as a marker of their chances of promotion to partner. Though there is little 
evidence of comparisons being drawn by the Respondents between "training work" 
and "paper work" it is clear that "training work" is deemed crucial to an associate ' s 
career development and their chances of partnership. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
The Questionnaire data reinforces the findings of the Case Study data regarding the 
high levels of importance attached by associates to the type of work assignments 
they undertake as a key indicator of their chances of promotion to partner. It also 
echoes the Case Study fmding on the importance of the increasing responsibilities 
tied to work assignments in giving the associates confidence that they could operate 
at partner level. As with the Case Study, no specific comparisons are made with 
"paper work" type assignments. However, in both instances, the inherent concern 
with the "quality" of work assignments undertaken indicates that "paper work" style 
assignments were not those sought by ambitious associates. 
Question 2(c) - does the research data provide any evidence of the role played by 
multiple incentives, alongside the tournament, in motivating associates?-
Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
High Wages - Provided they were paid at market rate for large law firms, the 
Respondents did not regard high wages as a motivational factor. One Respondent 
noted that not being paid at market rate was seen as a demotivating factor. 
General Legal Training - In general, this was rated as having a very low level of 
motivational impact with very few Respondents citing it as a highly motivational 
factor. The availabil ity of general legal training was often taken as a given. 
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Firm's Reputation - This was a strong motivating factor for the Respondents early 
on in their careers. It was an especially significant factor for those not motivated by 
the potential for promotion to partnership at this point. 190 
Opportunity for Promotion to Partner - Overall, this was regarded by the 
Respondents as an important motivational factor during their early career, although 
there were also a significant number of Respondents who did not perceive it to be 
motivational. 191 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
High Wages - The Questionnaire data and the Case Study data provide a near 
identical view of the relative lack of importance attached to high wages as a 
motivational factor. 
General Legal Training - Again the Questionnaire and Case Study data are 
consistent in their findings. 
Firm 's Reputation and Opportunity for Promotion to Partner - The Respondents 
generally give a higher rating to their firm's reputation as a motivational factor than 
do the Interviewees. This can probably be explained if we consider, for both groups, 
the fmdings on the motivational impact of promotion to partner. 
The Case Study data on prospects of promotion shows a very strong bias towards 
this factor as the majority of the Interviewees' main source of motivation. As noted 
in Part IVA: 
given the high degree of motivation to become partners within the 
Interviewee sample it is, perhaps, not surprising that the reputational benefits 
in the external employment market gained by working at a prestigious law 
firm would not be overly motivational for them. If their view is that they are 
going to make partner at this firm then the signals that their firm 's reputation 
sends to the external employment market about their abilities are Largely 
irrelevant. 192 
The Respondents are, as a whole, more equivocal about the motivational impact of 
partnership promotion during the early stages of their careers. Given these results, it 
is not surprising that the relative importance of the firm's reputation as a potential 
signal of quality to the external recruiting market place would be greater for the 
Respondents than the Interviewees . 
190 See Wilkins and Gulat i, op . cit., n. 3 , p. 1640 and co nsidered further at page 15 of this work . 
19 1 Note how its significance increases to the point at five /six years PQE when 24130 Respondents 
co nsider it to be the ir prime motivation. 
192 See page 43 of this work. This reinforces the co ntention that the Case Study firm, when compared 
to the firms from whi ch the Respondents are drawn, has an unusua lly stro ng cultural bias toward s its 
assoc iates feeling motivated by their prospects of achieving partnership . See page 88 , footnote 189, of 
this work . 
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Question 3(a) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
tournament exists for senior associates?- Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
The Questionnaire data roundly confirms that the tournament exists for senior 
associates. By the time they reach senior associate level it is rare for any of the 
Respondents to be outside the tournament. At five to six years PQE, twenty-four of 
the thirty Respondents consider promotion to partnership to be their prime 
motivation. 
The Questionnaire data reinforces the feeling that the tournament is at its liveliest for 
senior associates given that, competition from other associates was most keenly felt 
at around the five to six year PQE mark and that this is around the time when the 
Respondents also started to weigh up their chances of promotion. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
Though the Questionnaire data fails, when compared to the Case Study data, to 
provide as comprehensive a picture of the stages through which the Respondents' 
careers progress it does complement the Case Study data. Over half of the 
Respondents held partnership to be an important or very important motivational 
force from early in their careers and the data gives no reason to suspect that these 
Respondents would be any different from the Interviewees when it comes to how the 
prospect of promotion to partner influenced their working practices over time. So, 
for many of the Respondents, the tournament is not just confined to their time as 
senior associates. Notwithstanding this fmding, it is clear from the convergence of 
the phenomena consistent with the existence of a tournament, noted earlier, that the 
tournament peaks in observable intensity around the five to six year PQE level. This 
"noisy" convergence, perhaps reinforced by the seemingly large proportion of junior 
lawyers apparently not motivated by the prospects of partnership, may go some way 
to explaining why commentators have tended to focus on senior associates as the 
prime constituency of the tournament. 
However, given the dynamic nature of the tournament posited in the analysis of the 
Case Study data it is probable that the tournament, within its own set of time specific 
parameters, influences the behaviour of many junior lawyers. 193 A significant 
number of the Respondents who were disinterested in their partnership prospects as 
junior lawyers, did go on to become partners. This indicates that the behavioural 
norms associated with maintaining one's position as ajunior lawyer allow for the 
acquisition of experience and skills to a level that is sufficient for them to enter the 
tournament at a later stage without having been disadvantaged by their earlier 
disinterest. The other explanation for this phenomenon, of course, is that the 
tournament does not start, for any associate, until later in their careers. 
193 Considered further at page 48 ofth is work. 
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Question 3(b) - does the research data support or negate the proposition that the 
partnership promotion process is opaque?- Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
The Questionnaire data contains few comments that address the partnership 
promotion process directly and only very limited inferences can be drawn from the 
data relating to the factors that the Respondents find important when weighing up 
their chances of promotion to partnership. The one point of note is, perhaps, that the 
lack of reliance placed on formal channels of communication (such as appraisals) 
when contrasted to that attached to informal channels (work assignments undertaken 
and, especially, the informal communications with partners) suggests the process is 
unlikely to be a transparent one. 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
The Questionnaire data provides very little information on the partnership promotion 
process. Though there are similarities between the Questionnaire and Case Study 
data regarding the importance they both attach to work assignments and information 
provided on an informal basis by partners, it is not possible to make any worthwhile 
inferences as to whether or not the Questionnaire data supports or contradicts the 
Case Study data. 
Question 4 - How do associates weigh up their chances ofbecoming a partner? -
Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
Set out below, in approximate order of importance attached to them, are the factors 
that the Respondents used as sources of relevant information on their partner 
promotion prospects. Three main groupings were evident from the data in terms of 
the level of importance that the Respondents attached to them. Although there are 
significant differences between the groups as to level of importance, there is very 
little difference between the individual items within each group . 
Highly Significant Factors 
• Influence of supporters 
• Information from partners - via informal channels 
• Work assignments undertaken 
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Significant Factors 
• Inter/intra departmental politics 
• External economic factors 
• Rate of partner promotions 
• Formal appraisals 
• Salary/bonus levels 
Non-significant Factors 
• Continued hiring of junior lawyers 
• Partner promotions as a percentage of "entering class" 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
Like the Interviewees the Respondents did not use the rate of partner promotions as 
a percentage of "entering class" as a source of information on their chances of 
promotion to partner. Further, the lists of factors deemed to provide such relevant 
information are consistent between the data sets. However, there are significant 
differences in the level of importance/relevance attached to them when the two data 
sets are compared. 
Firstly, the Respondents attach a noticeably greater degree of significance to the 
influence that their supporters wie ld within the firm than do the Interviewees. This 
also applies to the role that interlintra-departmental politics plays in their prospects 
of promotion to partner. These fmdings appear to indicate that the Case Study firm is 
generally a less politicised environment than the firms from which the Respondents 
were drawn. 194 
Secondly, the level of significance attached to the rate of partner promotions by the 
Respondents is significantly lower than that attached to it by the Interviewees. 
However, it is clear from the data that a number of the Respondents did perform 
detailed analysis of how the partner promotion rate might affect them and their 
department's ability to successfully promote partners in the future. This indicates an 
awareness, on the part of the Respondents, of the political ramifications of 
partnership promotion decisions. This fits with the analysis, set out above, that is 
suggestive of the existence of a more politicised environment in the Questionnaire 
firms than in the Case Study firm. 
Given the relative lack of depth to the Questionnaire data, it is not possible to go on 
to consider, at a sufficient level of detail , the gaps that exist in the Respondents ' 
understand ing of the career progression. 
194 These findin gs also support the views o f Wilkins and Gulati (op . c it. , n. 3, p. 16 13) "partners are 
not neutra l umpires" and co nsidered furth er at page 13 of this work. 
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Question 5 - What promise are the associates monitoring? - Analysis 
Theore tical Framework 
From the analysis of the Questionnaire data it is possible to state that the 
Respondents did not monitor quite the implied promise envisaged by tournament 
theory. So does the Questionnaire data allow us to infer what they perceive to be on 
offer in return for the chance of promotion to partnership? 195 
The Questionnaire data analysis (especially the evidence of the factors that the 
Respondents regarded as significant indicators of their chances of promotion to 
partner) suggests that, alongside their interest in establishing partner credentials 
through accumulation of quality work assignments, the Respondents were concerned 
with monitoring the political aspects of the promotions process centring on dialogue 
with partners and the influence wielded by their partner supporters and departments. 
Partner promotion rates achieved a degree of significance within this matrix of 
concerns but were not of first order importance. 196 
Interplay with Case Study Data 
As noted above and in common with the Case Study data, the promise being 
monitored by the Respondents is certainly not quite that envisaged by tournament 
theory. From the importance attached by the Respondents to the quality of the work 
assignments they undertake, it is not too difficult to propose that the first limb of the 
alternative promise for the Interviewees, outlined in Part IVA, is equally valid for 
the Respondents . Given the quality of the Questionnaire data, however, it is more 
difficult to establish that the second limb of that alternative promise is valid for the 
Respondents. There are a number of factors, set out below, that support the second 
limb of the alternative promise. However, the Questionnaire data provides 
insufficient information on the role played by the Respondents' departments/groups 
in demonstrating that sufficient human capital exists to promote a further partner 
without diluting returns to the present partners. 
Eleven Respondents did mention, at various points in the Questionnaire, the 
importance of having a sound business case. Two of them specifically linked the 
assistance they received from their department/group with putting together a 
compelling business case. One of those comments is set out below. 
[Y]ou would get more complex deals or deals with major clients and also 
greater autonomy on deals if partners felt you were good and also if they felt 
you were on track and there was a need for the practice area to help build 
your business case [by providing you with this type of work] 
195 It should be noted that the two e lements relevant to thi s question, as it applied to the Case Study 
data, are just as relevant here , see pages 55 and 56 of this work. 
196 Query to what degree the Respondents v iew the partner promotion rate as simpl y a function o f the 
re la tive levels of po litica l power wielded by supporting partners and the indiv idual's department. 
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There is also a suggestion in the Questionnaire data that at least some Respondents 
were concerned to measure the levels of human capital that their departments might 
be able to provide to them. This is derived from the fact which six Respondents 
noted that the relative "strength" of their departments within the flfm would have a 
direct impact on their chances of promotion to partner. In this case I take the 
references to "strength" of their departments to mean the level of available and 
demonstrable human capital within the department which might support the 
Respondent's bid for promotion. However, as foreshadowed above, there seems to 
be insufficient evidence on which to base a proposition that the second limb of the 
alternative "promise" outlined in Part IVA holds true for the Respondents just as 
well as it does for the Interviewees. 
It should, of course, be noted that the above analysis does not mean that the 
proposition for an alternative "promise" does not apply to the firms that provided the 
Respondents for the Questionnaire. 197 However, it is also evident that some 
acknowledgement ofthe political factors that the Respondents feel are significant 
would also need to be integrated into any such alternative "promise" if it were to be 
applicable to the Respondents. In the same vein, additional investigation of the 
nature of human capital accumulation and extent to which departments cooperate 
with the Respondents in providing evidence of combined levels of human capital 
would be needed before the alternative "promise" might be applied, as is, to the 
Respondents. 
In summary, for the Respondents, the implied promise to promote to partner seems 
to be dependent on: 
• having established their partner credentials through the execution of various 
work assignments; 
• strength of the their business case; and 
• how the "political" elements inherent in the promotion to partner process affect 
the first two factors . 198 
Question 6 - Do Associates have a reasonably accurate understanding of the rules 
and partners' desires? - Analysis 
Though the quality of the data prevents us from proposing a fully formed alternative 
"promise/bargain" for the Respondents it should still be possible to consider whether 
or not the monitoring which they undertake, as revealed by the Questionnaire data, 
provides them with a "reasonably accurate understanding of the rules [of the 
197 It is clear that, just as w ith the Interv iewees, establishing partner credentials th rough the execution 
of various high qua lity work ass ignments forms part of the bargain for the Respondents. 
198 Give n the comments of some of the Respondents, my view is th at the politica l factors outlined by 
them wo uld have th eir greatest effect on how compelling the would-be partner' s business case is seen 
to be. As regards th e extent of an indiv idual's partner credentials, subjectiv ity will ex ist fo r a ll would 
be partners and is not confined to those firms where politica l factors are particul arl y relevant. 
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tournament] and the partners' desires,,1 99 for the purposes of the application of 
tournament theory. If the tournament does work as a model when applied to large 
law ftrms in the UK, there is an implication that associates (in this case the 
Respondents) do, in fact , monitor something very like the correct "promise". In 
considering this question I will deal with the Questionnaire findings and the 
comparison with the Case Study data at the same time, rather than taking each in 
turn as I have done in the preceding parts of this section. I again use Galanter and 
Palay's stylised version of "the rules,,2oo to assist in addressing this issue . 
The Stylised Rules 
1. The tournament is played over a fixed period of time - no relevant data gathered. 
2. A /l associates in an "entering class " compete for the prize of partnership -
Though the Respondents perceived the existence of competition for partnership 
slots during their careers (peaking at around five to six years PQE) no feelings of 
competition specific to their own "entering class" were evident. 
3. The prize is awarded to aflXed percentage of the top associates - As with the 
Interviewees, the Respondents did not base any analysis of their chances of 
promotion to partner on the "fixed percentage of entering class" formula. 
Overall, the Respondents were not as concerned as the Interviewees with 
monitoring the partner promotion rate, though some of the comments made by 
the Respondents indicated that they had undertaken detailed analysis of the 
impact of partner promotions on their own chances of promotion. At a 
departmental level at least, a good record of recent partner promotions was not 
necessarily viewed as a positive sign. 
4. The basis on which the award is made is the associate's ranking - judged 
subjectively - in the possession of two goods: 
• high quality legal work; and 
• their own human capital. 
In common with the Case Study data the Questionnaire data shows that the 
Respondents are concerned that they achieve a diet of high quality legal work, 
this indicates a close understanding of the fIrst limb of the rule. As already noted, 
however, the Questionnaire data is less clear-cut than the Case Study data on the 
matter of human capital acquisition. There is, however, in my opinion, sufficient 
evidence provided by the Questionnaire data to indicate that the Respondents 
well understand the second limb of the "rule". The evidence I rely upon in 
making this statement comes from three sources: 
• the number (11) and nature of the references to the importance of 
establishing a business case for promotion; 
199 Ga lanter and Pa lay, op. c it. , n. 27 , p.1688. 
200 Ga lanter and Palay, op. cit. , n. 34 , p. 960. 
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• the behaviours identified under Question A4, by the Respondents, as those 
on which they placed more emphasis once promotion to partnership became 
their prime motivation; and 
• Respondents' comments on the impact that the relative "strengths" of the 
various departments within their firms might have on their own chances of 
promotion. 
These sources indicate that the Respondents were aware of the need to cultivate 
their own human capital and that they acknowledged the role that the 
departments might playas a source of human capital for their partnership 
promotion bid. Though this data lacks the detail and specificity of the Case 
Study data, it does, in my view, allow the point to be made that the Respondents 
well understand the second limb of this "rule". 
5. The winners get a guaranteed andfixed amount of compensation - regardless of 
who wins - No relevant data gathered. 
6. Associates are reassured that the firm is keeping its side o/the bargain through: 
• consistent and readily observable partner promotion rates; and 
• continued hiring of new associates 
The Respondents were more equivocal on the importance they attached to 
partner promotion rates than were the Interviewees . The Respondents seemed to 
adopt a more individualised and ambivalent view of how partner promotion rates 
might affect their chances of promotion. On the other hand, the Respondents 
were unequivocal, to a significantly greater degree than the Interviewees, when it 
came to the lack of significance they attached to the continued hiring of junior 
associates. In summary, the Respondents ' views seem somewhat at odds with the 
implications of this "rule". 
Partners ' Desires 
The desires of the partners provide the basis for the existence of the rules analysed 
above and were summarised in Part IV A as the desire to: 
• have a workforce comprised of assistants who are motivated to work hard in the 
production of quality legal output with the minimum of supervision; and 
• promote only those associates who, as partners, will maintain or improve the 
existing partners' leve l of return from their business. 
As with the Case Study data the Respo ndents understanding of the first of the 
partners' desires is reflected in the importance they attach to the amount and quality 
of the work assignments they have performed. It is more difficult to assert that the 
Questionnaire data provides conclusive evidence of an understanding, on the part of 
the Respondents, of the second element set out above. Though there is evidence to 
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indicate that the Respondents have a grasp of the need to accumulate human capital, 
the level of detail contained within the Questionnaire data does not reveal whether or 
not they appreciate the full extent of the second element of the partners ' desires as 
formulated here. 
Notwithstanding the above analysis, given the high level of importance that the 
Respondents attach to the impact that "political" factors may have on their chances 
of promotion to partner, it might be necessary to amend the second element of the 
partners' desires formulation to read: 
• promote only those associates who, as partners, will.;. maintain or improve the 
existing partners' level of return from their business ; and preserve the partners' 
vested interests .201 
Conclusion and Addressing the Research Question 
Do lawyers at large UK law firms have the means by which they can monitor 
their firm's implied promise that a fixed percentage of them will be made up 
to partner in due course? 
Though, for the Respondents, it is not possible to propose a defmitive alternative to 
the promise outlined in the Research Question it is possible to contemplate with a 
degree of certainty their perception of the core ingredients of the Respondents part 
of the promise/deal. Again, though the reasoning is somewhat circular, it is 
undeniable that the Respondents have the means to monitor these core ingredients of 
the promise. It is less clear for the Respondents than the Interviewees that their 
perceptions reflect the overall content of the "rules" of the tournament as 
promulgated by Galanter and Palay. 202 However, there is evidence that the 
Respondents have a good understanding of, what for them is, the central "rule" of 
the tournament. That is, the basis on which the promotion to partner decision will be 
made. Though an understanding of the other "rules" might possibly provide comfort 
to associates that they have a chance of making partner, it is surely this rule that, at 
the very least, must be understood if an associate is to have: 
A reasonably accurate understanding of the rules [of the tournament] and the 
partners' desires203 
There is one especially telling set of data that, in my view, illustrates the acuity of 
the Respondents monitoring skills and their underlying understanding of the process. 
20 1 A c lear illustration of the preservation of partners ' vested interests is provided by the following 
comment ITom a Respondent: " I saw num erous highly talented lawyers leave from other parts of the 
firm (palticularly corporate) because of a lack of business cases. It was ga lling because they were so 
much better than the incumbents." 
202 id., p. 960. 
203 Gatanter and Patay, op. cit. , n. 27, p.t688 . 
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That is, the data comprised in Figs 6, 7, 8 and 9 which shows, for many of the 
Respondents, the convergence at around the five years PQE level of 
• the weighing up of their chances of becoming a partner ; 
• partnership becoming their prime motivation; and 
• an acute awareness of their competitors for partnership slots. 
For me, this indicates that, at least from that point on, the Respondents are confident 
that they have established their partner credentials and have a clear idea of what is 
needed for them to give themselves the best chance offulfilling their part of the 
promotion to partner promise/deal. The fact that it takes Respondents a fairly 
uniform two to three years to gain promotion to partner once they had weighed up 
their chances of promotion and made it their prime motivation suggests that their 
monitoring abilities were acute and that their knowledge of the process they were 
part of was accurate. This leads me to conclude that, overall, they had a reasonably 
accurate understanding of the rules and the partners' desires. 
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The temptation to form premature theories upon insufficient data is 
the bane of our profession. 
Sherlock Holmes204 
Part V 
Conclusions Based on Research Findings 
The Research Question 
Analysis of the field research data allows us to reach a number of interesting 
conclusions pertinent to the Research Question. The most obvious conclusion, 
widely previewed in Part IV, is that the implied "promise/deal" being monitored by 
associates is not the one envisaged by tournament theory and set out in the Research 
Question. This initial finding begs the question: what is the implied "promise/deal" 
that the associates are monitoring? In answering this question we reach the most 
significant of this thesis conclusion, which is that the implied "promise/deal" being 
monitored by associates is likely to bear a close resemblance to one of the "stylised 
rules" of the tournament proposed by Galanter and Palay, specifically that: 
The basis on which the award [a/partnership} is made is the associate's ranking 
- judged subjectively - in the possession 0/ two goods: 
• high quality legal work; and 
h . h . , 205 • t elr own uman caplla . 
In Part IVA I posited that for the Interviewees the implied "promise/deal" might be 
phrased as: 
We, the firm, will promote to partner those associates who: 
• Have established their partner credentials through the execution of 
their various work assignments; and 
• In combination with their group/department, have sufficient human 
capital to add a further partner to the partnership without diluting 
h . . 206 returns to t e eXlstmg partners. 
204 Sir Arthur Ignat ius Conan Doyle, The Valley o/Fear (1915). 
205 Galanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 34, p. 960, their rule four. 
206 See page 56 of this work. 
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For the Respondents there was less evidence to support the validity of the second 
limb of this alternative "promise/deal" and, more specifically, regarding the role of 
the Respondents ' departments in supplying human capital in support of their bid for 
partnership, In addition there were "political" factors evident for many of the 
Respondents that did not appear to exist for the Interviewees. This factor led me to 
suggest that, in coming to an understanding of the partners' desires, the Respondents 
may have perceived them as the desire to: 
• have a work force comprised of assistants who are motivated to work hard in the 
production of quality legal output with the minimum of supervision; and 
• promote only those associates who, as partners, will~ maintain or improve the 
existing partners' level of return from their business ; and preserve the partners ' 
vested interests.207 
The relevance of these various fmdings is that they all act to support Galanter and 
Palay's "rule" regarding the basis on which the award of partnership is made. This 
"rule" serves as a broad expression of the implied "promise/deal" that associates are 
intent on monitoring. The field research data and analysis thereof indicate that, with 
some further investigation, it may be possible to refme this broad statement. 
So, at the heart of the Research Question is the implied "promise/deal" and the 
research indicates that the promise actually being monitored constitutes the core of 
the theory of the tournament. That is, it provides the motivational impact that 
defrays the potential agency costs that arise when lawyers share their excess human 
capital. 
The data analysis provides strong evidence to support a further conclusion that the 
Respondents and Interviewees had a close understanding ofGalanter and Palay's 
"stylised rule" set out above and, therefore, an understanding of the basis of the 
implied "promise/deal". In consequence it is realistic to answer the Research 
Question in the afflfmative by concluding that the Respondents and Interviewees, 
when they were associates, did have the means by which they could monitor the 
implied "promise/deal".208 This conclusion is reached notwithstanding the 
acknowledged fact that the implied "promise/deal" is not that originally envisaged. 
Given the nature of the implied "promise/deal" and its significance, I believe it is 
also reasonable to state that the Respondents and Interviewees, as associates, had a 
reasonably accurate understanding of the rules of the tournament and the partners' 
desires relevant to them. Therefore they had, following Galanter and Palay, the pre-
207 See page 98 of this work . Such an amendment might also be sensibl y made to the alternative 
"prom ise/deal", set out at page 56 of this work , so that it better reflects the experience of many of the 
Respondents. It should a lso be noted that the existing rule can cope with the introduction of political 
factors as it envisages judgements will be made on a subjective basis. 
208 As considered in Part IV A, see page 56 of this work, there is a circularity, but undeniab le log ic, 
inherent in answering the Research Question in the affirmative in this way. If the implied 
"promise/dea I" is all in the perception of the associates and that perception is dependent on what the 
observe/monitor then they must have the means to monitor the promise. 
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requisite level of understanding for participants that allows the tournament to 
function. 209 
This research has provided strong evidence that the core motivational force of the 
tournament model exists within large law firms based in the UK. What a more 
detailed description of the model might consist of, however, must still be open to 
debate. Certainly, the perceptions of many of those who contributed to this research 
are not reflected in the more detailed features of the tournament model described by 
Galanter and Palal 10 and the various other writers on this subject. I set out in Part 
VI some of the areas for future study that might assist in this regard. 
209 Ga lanter and Palay, op. c it. , n. 27, p. 1688 . 
210 id., p . 1692 and as noted at page 17 of this wo rk. Ga lante r a nd Palay's v iew is that, at the core of 
the tournament lies th e " dea l" struck between the finn and its assoc iates. That is, the associates will 
work diligently in producing a large volume of high q ualit y lega l work fo r the flfln 's clients, in return 
for entry into the promotio n to partner tournament and that the other "dev ices" 0 f the tournament wi II 
be observable in d ifferent combinations in large law firm situations over time. 
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It's been a hard day on the planet 
How much is it all worth? 
It's getting harder to understand it 
Things are tough all over on earth. 
Loudon Wainwright m211 
Part VI 
Some Suggested Areas for Future Study 
In conducting this research numerous issues and areas for future study were revealed 
that are of relevance to tournament theory and its application to law firms but which 
are outside the scope of this thesis to develop. I set out below the most signi ficant of 
these issues. 
The key significance of work assignments as a means of establishing partner 
credentials - Further research on this issue would be a fruitful way of building on 
the 2006 work of: 
• Gulati et al on the role that work assignments (and specifically the accumulation 
of high numbers of billable hours by associates) play in establishing the partner 
credentials of associates ; 212 and 
• Wilkins and Gulati regarding the nature of "training work" and its relationship 
with the "tracking" of associates via work allocation practices. 
The role departments play in demonstrating the sufficiency of human capital, via the 
preparation of a business case, in support of an associate's bidfor promotion to 
partner - Specific investigation of this phenomenon may lead to a useful refmement 
of tournament theory as it relates to the accumulation and sharing of human capital 
and the basis on which promotion decisions are made. With hindsight, this is an area 
where the Questionnaire could have elicited more and better quality data if it had 
had a focussed more on the role of the Respondents ' departments in the provision of 
human capital. 
The changing dynamics of the tournament - The Case Study data provided an 
interesting insight into this aspect of the tournament model and the possible career 
211 Loudon Wain w right III , 'A Hard Day on the Planet ' ( 1986) More Love Songs. 
212 Gulati et a!, op. cit. , n. 6 1. 
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phases through which an associate may pass prior to reaching partnership. Any 
research, which enlarges our understanding of this topic, will have ready practical 
application in law firms . 
Gender specific motivations - This topic was only very briefly touched on in the 
analysis of the Questionnaire data.213 However, the starkness of the statistics 
revealed among this small sample of lawyers who went on to become partners cries 
out for further investigation, given the under-representation of women within the 
ranks of partners in major UK law firms. 
Impact of below market rate pay and discontinuance of hiring of junior lawyers -
Given the relative lack of importance attached to these aspects of large law firm life, 
it would be valuable to identify instances where these phenomena have occurred to 
ascertain the impact that they had on the perceptions of associates at those firms . 
Such an investigation would, I believe, provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
importance of these factors . 
The impact of senior non-partner roles on the motivations of associates - Recent 
announcements by a number of leading UK law firms that they have established, or, 
intend to establish, this type of role and career path as an alternative to partnership214 
make this a topical issue. Though only briefly touched upon in the body of this 
thesis,215 the potential for this type of development to affect the workings of the 
tournament would be a fruitful topic for future study. 
The "shadow ' of the tournament - This is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of 
tournament theory as it applies to law firms that might form the subject matter of 
future research. The "noisy" convergence of tournament specific phenomena at 
around five years PQE illustrates why many commentators have focused on senior 
associates as those most closely involved in the promotion to partner tournament. 
However, the question of what impact the tournament has on the working practices 
and behaviours of those not motivated by the prospect of promotion to partner is an 
stimulating one. From the Questionnaire data there is a suggestion that those not 
motivated by the prospect of partnership in the early stages of their careers are not 
prejudiced by this in their later pursuit of promotion. Whether this indicates that the 
tournament does not exist for junior lawyers or, that all junior Lawyers are forced 
into tournament compliant types of behaviour, would be a fascinating question for 
further investigation. It is only when we have at Least partially answered this 
question that we will have an accurate idea of just how important the tournament 
model is to the workings of large law firms. 
213 See page 66 of this work. 
214 Caroline Binham, Th e Lawyer ( 12 March 2007) http ://www. thc lawycr.co l11 /cg i-
b inlitc l11 .cgi? id = I 24642&d= I 22&h=24& - 46 and N ews Section Legal Week ( I Februa ry 2007) 
h ltp :/ Iwww. lcga lwcck.com/Artic Ics/ l 004403 ICC +sct+ to+crca tc+ncw+ca recr+ path + in+ fi'esh+work I i f 
c. htm l 
215 See page 57 of this work. 
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J hope that this thesis has achieved its overall goal: that by exploring the 
experiences and perceptions of lawyers in large law firms in the UK and drawing 
out common themes relating to their career progression. it has added to the general 
level of understanding of the human dynamics atplay in suchfirms. J also hope that. 
through further research and the practical application of some of the findings of this 
research. lawyers might achieve a greater appreciation of the situations in which 
they find themselves. enabling them to foel more at ease with and in command of the 
choices they face in their professional and personal lives. 
David Shujjlebotham 
Victoria University Wellington 
New Zealand 
March 2007 
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